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Abstract
By examining the historical development of Canada’s health insurance program 
this thesis demonstrates that the federal government played a significant role in 
establishing a national policy. Consequently, the federal government is obligated to 
promote, direct and contribute reasonable levels of fiinding to ensure the maintenance 
and stability of the program. However, through a series of negotiations and directives 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s the federal government has reneged on its financial 
contributions. In recent years the provinces have correctly asserted that federal financial 
commitments have dwindled and undermined the sustainability of our national health 
care program. This thesis examines how these funding cuts have been achieved as well 
as public and provincial reactions to shifting fiinding responsibilities and the overall 
effect on the health care system.
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Introduction
Universal health care in Canada has been shrouded in controversy and debate
since the institution o f  Hospital Insurance in 1957 and Medicare in 1968. Indeed, just
three years after Medicare’s inception, critic and author. Jack McLeod wrote,
...the existing health delivery system is increasingly recognized as being 
obsolete and the danger is that health insurance schemes may lock us into 
paying for an extremely inefficient and costly system... we have 
committed ourselves to public payment for health services which are 
beyond the present public means to control and ... health remains 
unorganized, unplanned and fragmented.... ^
However, despite the rhetoric of continued crisis, characterized by evolving
developmental pressures, conflicting political agendas and fiinding disputes, universal
health care remains the country’s most revered social program and, in many quarters,
symbolizes Canadian aspirations of social justice and equality.
For most Canadians the health care dilemma is played out and understood almost
exclusively as a localized issue. Hospital closures and doctor shortages are framed as
immediate and local concerns that are divorced from the broader pressures created by
shifting federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. This thesis broadens the discussion by
concentrating on the health care system and specifically examines ongoing changes to
fiscal policy and the consequences for our national health care program. Author Robert
W. Gordon believes polices and the adaptations associated with a specific policy are the
result of numerous “tiny contingent practices” representing a “universal historic force” . ^
In Canada, federal funding commitments were established, but through a series of policy
' Quoted in Gwendolyn Gray, Federalism and Health Policy: The Development o f Health Systems in 
Canada and Australia (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 106.
’ Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” Stanford Law Review, 36, (1983-84): 85.
adjustments implemented overtime the federal position has been radically altered. By 
examining fiscal arrangements including cost-sharing, the Established Programs and 
Financing Act (EPF), and the most recent Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), I 
will detail the federal government’s attempt to decentralize and reduce its financial 
commitment to social programs, particularly Medicare. As each decision was rendered 
and adjustments were enacted to fiscal policy, choices appearing rational at the time, the 
federal government became increasingly detached from its original commitment to the 
national health insurance program.
To explain the rationale behind evolving fiinding arrangements, this thesis will be 
centered on the relationship between the federal government and British Columbia.^ This 
specific relationship will provide the means to chart the shifting political and ideological 
perspectives of both the provincial and federal governments while, at the same time, 
allowing for a precise and detailed portrayal of provincial sentiment concerning federal 
spending power in health care. Certainly, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the 
assertions and agendas of the various provincial governments in British Columbia are 
representative of the entirety of federal -provincial relations on health care funding 
throughout Canada but, it is arguable that the British Columbian experience does 
illuminate a fiscal history of the current financing pressures experienced across the 
country. Although this thesis will argue that the federal government has sought to reduce 
its financial commitment to Medicare through changes in the federal - provincial funding 
structure, the object is not to place blame on either level of government for the current
 ^The term “federal” will be used in discussing relations between the two levels of government, rather than 
“dominion,” because it is consistent with the notion of fiscal federalism which underlies the emphasis on 
health care transfer arrangements.
“crisis” or to identify possible reforms in health care delivery. Rather the intent is to 
draw upon evidence concerning federal expenditures, analyze the policies that have 
influenced the flow of federal money and exhibit how this historical trend creates 
pressure for reform, but limits the range of current policy options.'* The province and the 
nation have not arrived at this current crossroad through happenstance; commitments 
were made, revisited, and probable consequences were fully appreciated. It is only with 
an informed historical perspective on these commitments and their legacy that the 
contemporary debate can precede beyond posturing and recriminations towards 
reconciliation of current fiscal concerns and declining social policy commitments.
In the waning years of the twentieth century the aura of crisis enveloping 
Canada’s health care system seemingly thickened with the implementation of the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer in 1995. In line with previous policy agendas, federal 
transfers for health care, education, and welfare, were combined into a single block of 
funding that effectively reduced the federal commitment by $6.2 billion.^ Not 
surprisingly, the change was greeted with provincial howls of protest. The core of the 
complaint was simple; many provinces argued that they were being saddled with 
increased responsibility for programs originally designed to be shared between the two 
levels of government. This latest response is in part the product of growing fiscal 
pressures on the provinces as they attempt to control expenditures and contain debt while 
maintaining services. Overall, federal fiscal restraint has illuminated the health care crisis
 ^Jacob S. Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the 
Development of British, Canadian and U.S. Medical Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 12 
(Spring 1998), 57-130. In his study Hacker argues that “by pushing policy development down a particular 
historic path, a policy passed at time T1 may significantly constrain die range of possible options at T2.
 ^Jack Stillborn, Federal -Provincial Relations (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch [93-lOE], 1998).
and Canadian health care “reform” has become the topic of the hour as increasing 
pressures for privatization brew in the provinces in the wake of budget reforms and the 
relevance of national standards becomes increasingly problematic.
Like all things political and jurisdictional in Canada, strained federal-provincial 
relations are a direct result of the 1867 British North America [BNA] Act that outlined 
areas of authority between the dominion and provincial governments. While the 
provinces retained jurisdiction in matters of a “local and private nature,” including health 
care, the federal government secured broad taxation powers and assumed responsibility 
for an undefined range of “national interests.” For the most part, during the early part of 
the twentieth century the provinces initiated health policies by developing or supporting 
insurance systems and providing assisted coverage for low-income earners. However, as 
social policies emerged many provincial governments began to request federal fiinding 
support for rapidly expanding programs. Education, health, income assistance and 
unemployment were areas viewed as national in scope and, in the minds of many 
politicians and Canadians, worthy of federal involvement. Correspondingly, increased 
action in social policy was rationalized by post-war Keynesian economic theory 
emphasising the correlation between a healthy and stable society and increased economic 
productivity. As a result, a more complicated and cooperative arrangement developed 
between the two levels of government as national policies emerged, rendering the 
independent roles of government laid out in the BNA Act impossible to sustain, as a 
whole.
At the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, the federal 
government introduced the “Green Book” outlining broad proposals to facilitate
employment and enterprise, provide protection against individual risks including
unemployment, sickness and old age and offered financial assistance to the provinces.^
Although the proposals were essentially shelved during the ensuing years of negotiation
on a broad range of programs, including health care, the conference nonetheless
highlighted the incorporation of social polices as matters of national interest. Indeed,
according to Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s opening statement.
The enemies we shall have to overcome will be on our own soil. They will 
make their presence known in the guise of sickness, unemployment and 
want. It is to plan for a united campaign in Canada against these enemies of 
progress and human well being that we have come together at this time... ^
Although speculation remains whether King sought to encourage collaborative efforts
between the two levels of government, subsequent dominion-provincial conferences
eventually created a complex, evolving symbiotic relationship.* Hobbled in their taxation
powers, the provinces received federal financial support which, in turn, provided the
federal government with leverage to implement and influence nation-wide policies in
areas deemed to be within provincial jurisdiction.
After a decade of discussion, the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act 
was introduced in 1956 as the first cost-shared health program. Its quick acceptance by 
the provinces and wide spread popular support would later justify establishing a 
comprehensive health insurance scheme embodied by the Medical Insurance Act in 1968,
® Entitled the Green Book, the federal government’s proposals at the 1945 Dominion-Provincial conference 
introduced a broad range of social policy options. These proposals will be furtlier discussed in Chapter 1.
' Quoted in Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and Public Policy: The Seven Decisions That Created the 
Health Care System, (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1987), 2.
* David Slater argues that although the King Liberals introduced the Green Book Proposals, they were not 
fully committed to ensuring the implementation of new and expensive social policies. See David Slater, 
“The White Book, The Green Book and the 1945-46 Dominion Provincial Conference on Rebuilding,” in 
Greg Donaghy ed., Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and their World in 1945 (Ottawa, Canadian Committee 
for the History of Second World War, 1997), 333.
a conditional cost-shared program providing basic universal health care for Canadians.
Specifically, in the act federal government agreed to match fifty percent of provincial
costs for insured services, provided that provincial programs met the criteria of
universality, comprehensiveness, portability and were publicly administered.
By the mid-century it was clear that issues regarding the health and welfare of
Canadians had exceeded provincial boundaries. In what would be his final year of his
Prime Ministership, Lester B. Pearson defended the interactive fimction of federal
funding. According to Pearson.
The governments of the provinces believe that their powers of taxation are 
too limited; the federal government believes that provincial taxing powers 
are virtually as great as its own. The governments of some provinces do 
not believe the Parliament of Canada should not use spending power in the 
way that it has; but in fact the use o f this power has been responsible for  
much o f Canada’s economic and social progress. There have been 
demands for wholesale transfers of taxing and spending power fi’om the 
Parliament of Canada; the federal government has replied that transfers to 
the provinces o f powers o f such magnitude would make it impossible to 
discharge its responsibility for the whole country^.
Clearly, Pearson viewed federal financial participation as the foundation of a national
health care program. In the end, despite the federal move into provincial jurisdiction and
confrontation over tax bases and program control, the establishment of Medicare
symbolized cooperative federalism. It remains one of the few programs where both levels
of government strived to establish sound social policy through a reasonably harmonious
exchange of ideas, enquiry and investment.
However, within a decade pressures for greater fiscal restraint and responsibility
began to undermine the foundations of the national health care program forcing federal
® Lester B. Pearson, Federalism for the Future [Tlie White Paper] (Ottawa: Supply Services, 1968), 162. 
[Authors emphasis]
policies towards decentralization. The connection between health care and a healthy 
economy diminished as the upward trend in provincial social spending was increasingly 
viewed as detrimental to the national economy. The 1970 Economic Council Economic 
Annual Review argued that “if the rate of increase of the past five years (1964-1969) were 
to continue unabated, these two areas of activity (health and education) alone would 
absorb the entire national product before the year 2000.” °^ Although the argument was 
flawed, since spending as a percentage of the gross national product only grew marginally 
in the 1960s and stabilized around seven percent during the 1970s, both levels of 
government nonetheless supported changes to the funding formula. This willingness to 
restructure was rooted in two distinct but related issues. Under the cost sharing formula 
there was little incentive for the provinces to control expenditures while Ottawa 
guaranteed to cover fifty percent of all insured costs. Not surprisingly the federal 
obligation increased at an alarming rate producing rising and unpredictable federal budget 
expenditures. At the same time the provinces complained that insured services under the 
cost sharing formula primarily targeted acute care in hospitals, arguably inhibiting the 
establishment of less costly preventative and out patient services. As a solution, block 
funding seemingly answered both federal and provincial concerns. On one hand the new 
funding structure allowed the provinces greater autonomy in determining provincial 
priorities for health care spending while, on the other, federal funding stabilized with the 
implementation of a predictable financing formula.
Unveiled in 1977, the new funding formula attracted what now appears to be far 
sighted criticism. Specifically, Medicare historian Malcolm Taylor warned.
10Taylor, 423.
As these words are being written, the Canadian health insurance system, 
whose tortuous history generated so much federal provincial conflict is 
being dramatically altered by the passage of the Established Programs and 
Financing Act [EPF], In a sense the new arrangements mark the end of a 
national program as the format of the conditional grant in aid is 
abandoned. “
In essence, while the new funding formula alleviated some concerns, some onlookers felt 
that the EPF signalled a decentralized role for a federal government slowly withdrawing 
from shaping health policies and increasingly concerned about national economic policies 
centred on deficit reduction. These issues were eventually given voice at the expense of 
social programs. Under the EFP, transfers included a fixed per capita grant based on 
1975-76 expenditures adjusted annually according to the rate of growth of the GNP. The 
grant consisted of two elements; a cash component in concert with tax points for the 
provinces. While provinces were concerned that the EPF would result in lower transfers, 
the opposite was true for the first four years of the program. Despite these initial results, 
there was continued apprehension, as indicated by Taylor, that the EPF Act could 
ultimately undermine the universal health care system when influenced by the emerging 
economic ideology of fiscal restraint. Three issues were of particular concern. First, 
although the provinces remained answerable to the four principles of universality, 
portability, public administration, and comprehensiveness, the absence of legislated 
enforcement mechanisms meant that federal funding was no longer tied to the 
maintenance of these standards. Second, since funds were no longer earmarked for 
specific health care delivery programs, the monies were effectively considered part of 
general provincial revenues, and consequently could be dedicated to other spending 
priorities. Finally, the EPF was not guided by legislation guaranteeing continual federal
" /W .. 487.
funding for health care and post secondary education, although expenditure cuts and 
structural changes to the program would require three years notice to the provinces. 
Essentially the EPF acted as a “critical juncture” in the ongoing historical progression of 
health care financing in that a seemingly rational and uneventful adjustment to policy 
“resulted in large eventual consequences.”*^
By the 1980s the fears of a decentralized federal role were coming to fmition. 
Owing to the unconditional nature of EPF fimding, user fees and extra billing emerged, as 
did accusations that health dollars were being siphoned into other programs. These 
problems were fiirther exacerbated by a decade of declining federal transfers under the 
EPF program. To meet the emergent concerns over extra billing, the federal government 
instituted the Canada Health Act in 1984 reintroducing conditional fiinding through the 
use of fiscal levers. The act defined more precisely the conditions of federal payments, 
adding accessibility to the previous four national standards, and tied extra billing to dollar 
for dollar reductions in cash transfer payments. As a result of the historical conflict 
between jurisdiction and funding authority, the federal government may have had little 
choice but to impose fiscal levers to uphold the views and values of Canadians. The 
Canada Health Act, once again, allowed the federal government to enforce national 
standards, but the return to conditional funding did not include a legislated commitment 
for continued federal financial support. Thus, in the years following the act, substantial 
fiinding reductions were introduced. These developments lent themselves to a series of 
questions. Can Canadians expect the provinces to maintain national standards with 
increasing limited fiinds? If we desire a continued commitment to these principles what
Hacker. 77. A critical juncture is defined as a crucial period of transition that shapes political and 
economic development for decades to come.
should the federal role be in assuring and providing a niche for adherence? Should there 
be federal initiatives to encourage reform within these standards? Or should Canadians 
accept limited federal spending commitments and work towards reform within the 
emerging framework? No single study can hope to provide conclusive answers, but this 
thesis seeks to broaden the mindset for reform beyond local issues.
While Ottawa maintained its claim of protecting national standards, the provinces 
carried the increasing burden of reduced federal monies under the EPF. In 1982 basic 
cash allotments—a base line figure granted to all provinces regardless of their own tax 
revenues—was replaced with a formula that calculated the allotment in relation to 
revenue. The result was that the provinces with large tax revenues received a 
proportionate reduction in the cash allotment. Three years later the federal government 
introduced a series of EPF reductions through an adjustment of the financing formula in 
relation to GNP. This escalator, the means of connecting EFP financing to the rate of 
growth in the economy, was reduced by two percent in 1986/87, and an additional percent 
in 1989 and, one year later in 1990, was frozen at zero for five years. Given inflation, the 
zero growth in EPF payments translated into reduced transfers for the provinces where 
the costs of health care continued to rise. The consequences were mirrored in the Health 
Action Lobby claim that reductions during the period from 1986-87 to 1995-96 resulted 
in a shortfall of $30 billion dollars in respect to health related transfers to the provinces.
' Health Action Lobby, A Prescription for Medicare (Ottawa; HEAL, 1995).
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Changes in the EFP formula are indicative of the evolving federal role in social
policy. Writing in the 1970s, political analyst, William Livingston argued that “the
essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in society
itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of society are
articulated and protected.” But in a 1995 author Jean Denis Frechette claimed just the
opposite, that the federal economic role was no longer compatible with the social ideals
of the past. According to Frechette,
.. .now more than ever it is the economy that must dictate how federal transfer 
payments are financed...the federal government would seem to be feeling 
more and more trapped by its policy of imposing national standards... In the 
coming years economic rationality will have to win out over constitutional 
concerns. If the central government wants to reduce transfer payments, it will 
have to rethink standards that have become incompatible with economic 
reality and make them more flexible.
Indeed the emerging ideology has engendered a shift in how the federal role has been
perceived. In the 1940s, the dominant liberal tradition suggested that a stable economy
was achieved via a healthy and productive society, whereas in the 1990s the very means
of contributing to a healthy populace was portrayed as detrimental to economic growth.
The financing policy has been significantly reshaped over the last three decades.
In the process the federal government has diminished its financial commitment to health
care, compromised national standards, and shifted increasing responsibly for health care
to the provinces. The fiinding retractions entrenched in the past policies have been
driven by economic, political and social concerns and are highly unlikely to be restored to
previous levels. Despite some concessions to the provinces in the year 2000, continued
Quoted in Gray, 7.
Jean Denis Frechette, Federal Transfers to the Provinces For Health and Post-Secondary Education: 
New Trends (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Paper [93-lE], 1995).
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pressures for fiscal restraint at all levels of government are going to force the provinces 
and the nation to examine reform options, some of which may deviate from the vary 
principles that guide the program.
This thesis will highlight the evolution of funding arrangements for health care 
with an emphasis on the federal role. Both the cash and tax point elements of the transfer 
will be addressed, although an emphasis on the cash value will dominate since it is the 
portion of the transfer specifically tied to health funding and enforces compliance with 
national standards. Tax points are considered part of general revenues and thus provincial 
governments are not committed to allocating this portion of the transfer to health or post­
secondary education. As a result, the residual cash becomes an essential mechanism 
through which the federal government can influence health policies. Further, while I will 
discuss the actual transfers British Columbia received, and how reductions in these 
transfers may influence the spending capacity of the province, the thesis will not address 
how the British Columbia government manages health care dollars.
Chapter one discusses the British North America Act of 1867 and how 
jurisdictional and funding powers allocated in the act continue to influence federal- 
provincial relations. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (1957) and 
Medical Care Act (1968) will also be sketched to document the extent to which both 
levels of government supported the development of a national health policy. The chapter 
will close by outlining the cost-sharing arrangements that applied to both programs. 
Chapter two will analyze the pressures contributing to the move fi’om cost-sharing to 
block funding, describe the new funding formula, suggest some problems inherent in the 
new arrangement and how the EPF marked a decentralized role for the federal
12
government. This chapter will also address the paradigm shift, first evident at the federal 
level, where economic priorities emphasised deficit reduction and cost efficiency. As a 
result, managing transfer payments became a major source of cost reduction. Here it will 
also be argued that while the Canadian public continued to support the ideals of health 
insurance programs they were excluded from understanding the inner workings of the 
transfer payment system. In chapter three changes to the funding arrangement from 1982 
to 1995 will be explained with specific tables outlining federal transfers to the province of 
British Columbia. The chapter will address how the diminishing federal fiscal 
commitment has shifted greater responsibility onto the provinces and ultimately 
jeopardizes the commitment to national standards as provincial governments seek reforms 
beyond the limitations of the Canada Health Act in order to reduce costs and control 
expenditures. Further reactions from the province to the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer will highlight their demands for a more interactive federal funding role in the 
field of health care. The conclusion will briefly address the impending pressures for 
reform and recommendations regarding a federal commitment outlined in the Romanow 
Commission released in 2002. Given that health care continues to dominate the social 
agenda, public perceptions regarding health care and its financing will also be addressed 
throughout the discussion.
Ultimately, this thesis examines the federal role and approach to transfer payments 
in the field of health care. Federal-provincial relations will be framed within a B.C. 
context, but will not address specific provincial reforms, policies or initiatives.
Through detailing the historical development of fiscal policy we will witness the 
declining federal financial commitment to health care, resulting in shifting responsibility
13
to the provinces. Framed in this manner this thesis will contribute to a general 
understanding of how transfers functioned and evolved, and detail how continual minor 
policy adjustments compound overtime to yield broad and serious consequences.
14
Chapter One
Establishing the Ideal; Building the Canadian Health 
Care System
Universal health care in Canada was the result of myriad social and political 
forces, shaped by ideas and initiatives coinciding at critical period in the country’s 
history. By the mid twentieth century the welfare state had become increasingly 
prominent in matters once considered to be private. Under the British North America Act, 
and a generation of judicial interpretation, provincial and local governments expanded 
their influence in the areas of health, education and welfare. ^  Mounting pressure from the 
provinces in concert with a shifting of governance eventually solidified a federal 
commitment to a nation wide health insurance program. This chapter briefly surveys the 
evolution of health insurance policy, beginning with early British Columbia and 
expanding to later national initiatives. Framed within this context the central role of 
intergovernmental relations in shaping the original cost sharing arrangements for Hospital 
and Medical Care insurance will be highlighted. The road to universal health care was 
both long and complex and it is clear that neither the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic 
Services Act (1958) or the Medicare Care Act (1968) would have evolved without the 
cooperative and concerted efforts of both levels of government.
The delineation of powers outlined in the British North America Act of 1867 
recognized and entrenched the areas of responsibility between the provinces and the 
newly established Dominion government. In pre-confederation Canada limited forms of
' For a discussion on early Canadian social policy see: Gwendolyn Gray, Federalism and Health Policy: 
The Development o f Health Systems in Canada and Australia (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991); 
Raymond B. Blake and Jeff Keslien eds.. Social Welfare Policy in Canada: Historical Readings (Toronto: 
Copp Clark, 1995); Carl A. Meiliche and Janet 1. Storch eds.. Perspectives on Canadian Health and Social 
Policy: History and Emerging Trends (Michigan: Health Administration Press, 1980).
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social welfare were delivered through non-profit, voluntary organizations as well as 
municipalities guided by traditional poor laws. Given the undeveloped nature of social 
policy, any suggestion that the Dominion have authority to legislate in these areas would 
have been inconsistent with the Dominion’s initial goal of facilitating economic 
prosperity across the nation. At the time of Confederation, Dominion and Provincial 
government objectives emphasised economic development, infrastructure and trade. For 
the most part social policies, of the type that would emerge in the twentieth century, were 
non- existent. Thanks to changing public attitudes, the role of the state had become 
increasingly prominent in matters previously dealt with by extended family structure or 
by institutions devoted to the indigent.
Notwithstanding the delineation of powers outlined in the British North America
Act of 1867, specific jurisdictional authority was subjected to interpretation and debate as
issues involving program initiation, taxation powers and financing responsibilities
emerged. Writing in 1950 historian Elizabeth Wallace noted that
when the framers of the British North America Act distributed powers 
between the Dominion and the Provinces with the intention of conferring 
on the former all the great subjects of legislation, the exiguous 
responsibility for health and welfare... were considered local and private, 
and thus properly to come within the provincial sphere. The Act did not 
impose any obligations to provide welfare services upon either the Dominion 
or the Provinces, but simply allocated, with less precision than its framers 
had hoped to achieve, the various spheres of jurisdiction, any subsequent 
action being permissive not mandatory.... The fathers of confederation 
clearly thought they were assigning the provinces the unimportant and 
inexpensive fimction of government, among which education, hospitals, 
charities and municipal institutions were then reasonably numbered.^
As time would reveal, these “obligations” would be viewed as essential, increasing in
Elizabeth Wallace, “The Origin of the Welfare State in Canada, 1867-1900,” in Carl A. Meiliche and 
Janet Storch eds., Perspectives on Canadian Health and Social Services Policies: History and Emerging 
Trends (Michigan; Health Administration Press, 1980). 26.
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both importance and expense.
Accordingly, under Section 92 of the BNA Act the provinces were allocated “all 
matters of a local or private nature,” including exclusive power for the “establishment, 
maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities, eleemosynary institutions 
in and for the province other than marine hospitals.” Section 91 assigned exclusive 
powers to the dominion. They were also designated additional authority to “make laws 
for the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada” securing a central role for the 
dominion in establishing policies of national interest.
“Matters of a local and private nature” included the most significant categories of 
modern social policy- education, health and welfare. As these envelopes grew at 
provincial expense, a fiscal commitment the fathers of confederation could have scarcely 
predicted, a federal presence in provincial jurisdictions came to be justified on the basis 
of “national interests.” At Confederation these interests were primarily economic in 
nature, however when social distress compromised capitalist production the lines of 
jurisdictional authority became blurred. According to Antonia Maioni, “Canada 
represents the ‘liberal’ model of welfare state development that emphasises individual 
initiative and opportunity, where social policy is more residual in nature and associated 
with the role of the market.”  ^ For example, during the 1930s the country experienced 
staggering unemployment rates. Dominion involvement, through grants to the provinces, 
could in part be justified as investment in the work force and ultimately the economy. 
Limited to direct taxation, some provinces welcomed a degree of “federal intrusion,” in 
the form of financing, arguing that the federal government had a broader tax base to
 ^Anatonia Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1998). 3.
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support growing social policies. The implications of this view will be addressed in the 
following chapter.
In the post confederation era provincial governments were gradually enticed to 
deliver health care services, expanding the role of scientific medicine, access to care, and 
ultimately public expectations regarding personal and social health and wellness. In the 
late nineteenth century social and economic conditions had altered so radically that 
provision of health and welfare services became a significant component of political and 
social movements. The influence of industrialization contributed to rapid urbanization, 
shifting social relationships, and unstable economic patterns.^ As in all parts of Canada, 
private institutions, extended family, and municipalities provided limited social welfare 
services. However, Megan J. Davies has argued that in British Columbia, late settlement 
patterns in the west meant that municipal health and welfare service in the province were 
“embryonic” and its “charitable organizations limited.”  ^ In fact the narrow nature of 
social welfare in British Columbia was exacerbated by the fact that unlike other Canadian 
provinces it was not guided by traditional poor laws. Rather, limited social welfare 
provisions were directed by a clause in the Municipal Act stating that “it shall be the duty 
of every city and district municipality ... to make suitable provisions for the poor and 
destitute,” According to Harry Cassidy “the obligation did not mean much in the early 
days of municipal history, partly because demands for relief were small and partly
For more information regarding the consequences of industrialization see: Raymond B. Blake and Jeff 
Keshen eds.. Social Welfare Policy in Canada: Historical Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995); Allan 
Muscovitch and Jim Albert eds.. The Benevolent State: The Growth o f  Welfare in Canada (Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1987); or Pat Armstrong, ' The Welfare State as History,” in Raymond B. Blake, Penny E. 
Bryden and J. Frank Strain eds.. The Welfare State in Canada: Past Present and Future (Moimt Allison: 
Irwin Pubhshing, 1997).
 ^Megan J. Davies, “Competent Professionals and Modem Methods: State Medicine in British Columbia,” 
Bulletin o f the History o f Medicine 76(1), (2002): 56-83.
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because there was no provincial machinery to guarantee that the local authorities would 
take it seriously.”  ^As a result, the consequences of industrialization meant the need for 
social support mechanisms outstripped the capacity of traditional methods. Rapid 
population growth brought fiscal and delivery pressures that small, localized institutions 
were incapable of meeting. In British Columbia the population increased from 98,000 in 
1891 to nearly 700,000 in 1931.^ Further, these population increases combined with 
urbanization and industrialization contributed to a whole host of public health concerns, 
including contagious diseases and sanitary issues, that were beyond the capabilities of 
traditional providers where training and fiinding was essential to service delivery. In 
addition, the boom and bust cycle of economic activity that characterized the province 
made it extremely difficult for localized organizations to deliver services during periods 
of excessive demand. As a consequence, the province became increasingly involved in a 
variety of social welfare issues.
Unable to deal with the expanding health concerns flowing from rapid 
urbanization, the municipalities turned to the province for assistance. Specifically, in 
response to a small pox epidemic and a cholera outbreak, the provincial government 
demonstrated a willingness to invest in the health care field by instituting the Public 
Health Act of 1892. The act established a Provincial Board of Health and designated 
municipal councils as local boards to address health concerns regarding sanitary 
conditions and communicable diseases.^ Gradually, the province expanded services and
® Harrv M. Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare Organization in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1945), 
44.
' 38.
* Ibid., 41. Cassidy discusses the expansion of public health services in the province of British Columbia 
from 1890s to early 1930s.
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it financial commitment to the public health program. In the early part of the twentieth 
century the province legislated and expanded the Public Health Code on a variety of 
fronts including Tuberculosis (1901), Sanitary Inspection and Regulation (1904), Food 
Inspection (1906), Medical Examination of School Children (1910), and Sanitary 
Conditions in Work Camps (1911). Initially, the team of public health officers delivering 
the program remained minimal, but during the post war period the province committed to 
finding and training additional public health nurses and expanding public health 
initiatives.^ In a 1928 address to the Canadian Public Health Association, Dr. Esson 
Young claimed that World War 1 “marked the awakening of the public conscience” and 
consequently the expansion of provincially operated public health programs. He claimed 
that prior to the war “the voices of public health authorities were crying in the wilderness. 
The public was not concerned. Epidemics were considered visitations from providence.” 
However, when nearly one third of Canadian Army recruits were rejected as unfit for 
military service, a healthy populace became a crucial component in promoting and 
protecting the nation. According to Monica Green “the war had shown that general 
health measures had prevented outbreaks of disease, as well as demonstrated the benefits 
of good health and medical care. The public was now in the mood to accept advice in 
health matters, and at the same time health authorities had broadened their scope to 
include general health protection, advice and preventative health measures.”
The economic emphasis on raw resource extraction in the west meant the 
provincial population was widely dispersed and often isolated. Cassidy argued that the
® For information on the establishment and expansion of public health nursing in the province see: Monica 
Green, Through the Years with Public Health Nursing (Ottawa: Canadian Public Health Association, 1983).
10 Green, 8.
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provinces were enticed into areas of public health given the “incomplete coverage and 
relative weakness of the municipal system.” *^ In 1941 a quarter of the population resided 
in “unorganized territory.” Further most municipalities were small, and consequently 
limited in revenue generating powers. In 1941, only 22 of 61 cities and districts had more 
than 5,000 people. Retaining jurisdiction over unorganized territory, the province was 
increasingly compelled to provide care for the infirmed and sick through subsidies and 
grants to hospitals, physicians and private agencies offering care to individuals outside 
municipalities. Sporadic settlement patterns coupled with specific public health concerns 
also contributed to the expansion of health institutions throughout the province. For 
example, in 1907 the province issued grants to establish and maintain the Tranquille 
Sanitorium in Kamloops for tuberculosis patients. The facility, which also acted as a base 
for a travelling diagnostic clinic, was supported and later purchased by the province in 
1921.
The province exhibited other commitments to the public health front in 
implementing the Disease Control Act of 1919. Aided by Dominion grants, the province 
also established free treatment clinics in Vancouver and Victoria and, in the course of the 
next decade, the province also struck various agreements with hospitals to process public 
health laboratory work. Given the high volume of work, the province opened its own lab 
in Vancouver in 1931. Four years later the Medical Services Branch was established 
continuing work in areas of public health including tuberculosis, venereal diseases, 
sanitation and compilation of vital stats. Margaret Andrews argued provincial efforts to
"  Davies. 60.
Cassidy, 39. 
'^/W.,78.
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expand and promote public health services coincided, and perhaps facilitated, a growing 
public awareness regarding the capabilities of scientific medicine. “In the four decades 
prior to 1920 there was an increasing variety of medical products available; new types of 
surgery, new diagnostic aids, new drugs, new immunization agents -  all of which 
significantly increased doctors’ ability to cure and prevent ill health.” ''* According to 
Andrews, increasing public health and education programs including “wartime health 
measures and receipt of medical treatment under workers compensation laws all tended to 
increase consumer acceptance of medical products and treatments in the early part of the 
century.” '  ^ With greater public acceptance of medical practice the public increasingly 
developed expectations pertaining to types of services they deemed necessary. However, 
Megan Davies points out that provincial commitment to public health during the 1920s 
and 1930s was not base solely on humanitarian rational. “Positive Public Health,’ a 
buzzword of B.C.’s public health professionals in the 1930s fit well with the ... broader 
shift in public health away from the concept of'd irt’ to an interest in personal hygiene. 
The state would provide each individual with the education and services necessary to 
attain good health; individuals then had an obligation to be healthy and productive 
citizens.... thoughts about public health ... were therefore more concerned with fiscal
Margaret W. Andrews, “The Course of Medical Opinion on State Health Insurance in British Columbia. 
\9\9-\92,9r Histoire Sociale 16(31) (1983): 134.
Ibid. Note, the Workers Compensations Act was implemented in the Province of British Columbia in 
1916.
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management and bureaucratie efficiency than with humanitarianism.”'^ Despite the 
province’s positive investment in public health, which was not intended to meet private 
health needs, increasing numbers of individuals were unable to afford necessary hospital 
and physician care.
Active participation by the provincial government in public health contributed to 
British Columbia’s unique interest in establishing a health insurance program. The 
Liberals felt such an endeavour might help to quell the turbulent industrial relations that 
plagued the province. The end of World War I had marked the return of workers and 
veterans eager for social policies. Historian David Naylor noted that “with 6,255 native 
sons dead in the war and more than 13,000 wounded returning to the province, some 
improvement to domestic conditions seemed called for as a gesture of gratitude for 
sacrifices made in Europe.” '  ^ Further, throughout the interior police frequently engaged 
in battle with striking miners and loggers demanding improved working conditions, 
increased wages and benefits.** The growth of a discontent working class also contributed 
to the rise of social democratic, labor and socialist political affiliations. Indeed, as early 
as 1916 an assortment of left-of-center candidates gained a foothold in provincial politics 
and, in so doing, pressed the Liberals to investigate extensive social reforms.*^
In reaction to escalating public and political pressures in 1919, Liberal J.W. 
Mackintosh raised the issue of public insurance in the legislature. The queries eventually 
led to the appointment of an unproductive B.C. Welfare Commission to investigate 
mothers’ pensions, maternity benefits, state health insurance and public health nursing
Davies. 66.
' ' David Naylor, Private Practice, Public Payment (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1986), 41.
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arrangements. While the report claimed “evidence ran strongly in favour of legislation on 
all fronts,” the section pertaining to health insurance was never officially acknowledged 
or published.^^ While mother pensions were introduced in 1921, the reining Liberals 
acknowledged that the issue of health insurance required greater investigation and an 
extensive investment beyond the fiscal capabilities of the province. While other social
programs developed and expanded, such as old age pensions, workers compensation and 
public health, a health insurance scheme for the province remained on hold.
The depression of the 1930s further illuminated the inadequacies of traditional 
welfare mechanisms mobilizing a social agenda calling for government intervention in 
unemployment, health, welfare and education. Megan Davies argues that the presence of 
young, progressive, reform minded public servants, including George Wier, Esson Young 
and Harry Cassidy, fostered the expansion of public health front despite the economic 
downtum.^^ But the economic collapse of 1929 brought sharp rises in unemployment and 
left many citizens unable to obtain basic necessities. An epidemic of national 
proportions, federal aid became essential for financially drained municipalities and 
provincial governments across the country. Continued pressure to alleviate social 
conditions, magnified by economic depression, led to a new Royal Commission in 1932 
on State Health Insurance and Maternity Benefits. The Commission recommended a 
compulsory health insurance plan for all employed persons below a fixed level of income, 
with voluntary admission available to all other persons, paving the way for subsequent
Ibid. 44. Also see Allan Irving, “The Doctors Versus the Experts: Harry Morris Cassidy and the British 
Columbia Health Insurance Dispute of the 1930s”, BC Studies, no.78 (Summer 1988).
Tassidy, 46. Cassidy discusses the allowances for Mothers’ Pensions.
^  Davies, 66.
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legislation.^^ Looking back from the vantage point of 1945, provincial director of social 
welfare Harry Cassidy claimed the report was indicative of the changing political climate. 
“Clearly the time had come for a provincial government to turn from the easy going 
frontier politics of roads and bridges, construction contracts and patronage and the spoils 
of the office to the politics of social welfare in order to retain the confidence of the 
people.” '^*
Given the recommendations of the report and political pressures to expand social 
policy commitments the Liberals once again added health insurance to their agenda. 
Labour movements in the province had a strong and successful history and were a critical 
component in shaping political platforms. The growing middle class tended to support 
expanding social polices and consequently emerging left wing political groups that 
espoused such goals. In British Columbia the newly formed, socially attuned, Canadian 
Commonwealth Federation, which had established a strong following in Saskatchewan, 
was preparing to run in the 1933 election. Political competition served to ensure the 
Liberals would continue to support progressive social policies in an effort to maintain the 
working class vote and political supremacy.
With a victory behind them the Liberals pursued their ambitious endeavour to 
establish public health insurance in the province. Initially, they requested federal loans to 
help subsidize the plan, but were turned away. Claiming such a program was beyond 
their jurisdiction, R.B. Bennett’s Conservative government left the provincial Liberals 
under Premier Dufferin Pattullo to forge ahead with a draft health insurance bill in
Cassidy. 64. 
-''/A id .
^  Maioni, 61.
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1935.^ Davies described Pattullo as a progressive “reformist” that supported the 
development of health and social welfare, promoting “an active interventionist state under 
the direction of experts.” Given strong political motivation the B.C. Health Insurance Act 
received royal assent on 1 April 1936, providing compulsory coverage of wage earners 
receiving less than $150 per month. Given that indigent populations were often covered 
under existing provincial -  municipal arrangements, the act targeted low income earners 
as those most likely to experience financial hardship during a medical crisis. Insured 
persons and dependants were provided medical benefits covering doctor services, 
hospitals, partial drug costs, and necessary x-ray and diagnostic services. Coverage 
would be funded through contributions from wage earners and employers, with 
government aid limited to administration and coverage of indigents. Despite popular 
public support, financial considerations, political vulnerability and opposition from the 
B.C. Medical Association (BCMA), the B.C. Manufactures Association, the Chambers of 
Commerce and Board of Trade prevented implementation of the bill. Initially, provincial 
physicians were receptive to some form of health insurance for compassionate reasons, 
coupled by the reality that high unemployment rates and unpaid bills were affecting their 
bottom line. Margaret Andrews confirms that during the 1920s “doctors in the province 
clearly supported the establishment of a provincial health insurance system on the
The federal government was particularly adamant about maintaining jurisdictional boundaries in the early 
1930s owing to a recent ruling of the Privy Council. In 1928 the House of Commons requested a Standing 
Committee on Industrial and International Relations to investigate unemployment, sickness and disability 
insmance. In their findings the conunittee recommended further study into a national health insurance 
program. As a result, the Employment and Social Insmance Act was passed in 1935 incorporating an 
Administrative Commission to develop various forms of social insurance for enactment by the govermnent, 
including health insurance. However, the Act was appealed by both the Canadian Supreme Court and the 
Privy Council ruling it imconstitutional based on jurisdictional authority. See J. Harvey Perry, A Fiscal 
History o f  Canada: The Post-War Years (Canadian Tax Foundation, Paper No. 85, 1989).
“ Cassidy, 91.
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understanding that it would cover much of the treatment they had been providing without 
pay.”^^  Although the provincial government had worked closely with the Canadian 
Medical Association (CMA) in developing the Act, the BCMA continued to express 
concerns over third party intervention and capitation forms of remuneration and argue 
that set income ceilings prevented doctors from directly billing financially secure 
patients/^ But most concerning was the fact that the act failed to cover the unemployed 
and indigent population. When physicians were questioned “Are you prepared to work 
with the Health Insurance Act as it now stands? Only 13 of 633 respondents supported the 
plan.^“ Meanwhile the business community complained increased payroll taxes would 
drive up prices allowing eastern competitors an unfair advantage.^ ^ On going controversy 
and debate coincided with party concerns over the upcoming election resulting in an 
indefinite postponement of the bill. However, in an effort to attract voter attention and 
gain a sense of public support regarding the policy, the liberals polled British Columbians 
during the 1937 election. Voters were asked “Are you in favour of a comprehensive 
Health Insurance Plan progressively applied?” Fifty-nine percent of voters supported 
such a plan.^  ^Given established support it is clear the public desired some form of health
insurance.
Given the province’s inability to overcome opposition on the health insurance
^  Andrews, 132. A 1934 government survey of British Columbia physicians showed that 29% of patients 
in 1929 did not pay for medical attendance they received.
For an extensive discussion on the attitudes of both the CMA and BCMA towards the health insurance in 
Canada see, David Naylor, Private Practice and Public Payment (Montreal and Kingston; McGill -  
Queen’s Universitj' Press, 1986). For a discussion specific to BCMA objections during the 1930s debate see 
pp. 76-83.
^  Andrews, 141.
Naylor. Note: PayToll taxes were not to exceed 2% of the total payroll and employees were capped at 3% 
of their wages for maximum contributes to the program.
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front, in 1940 the BCMA unveiled the Medical Services Associated Plan, a non-profit, 
physician sponsored health insurance plan with membership limited to groups of ten or 
more employees. Rates consisted of an initial registration fee of $1.50 supplemented by 
monthly dues of $1.15 for individuals or $2.38 for dependants.Doctors were 
reimbursed through a fee schedule negotiated with the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons. The program operated on a similar basis as Blue Cross and a variety of other 
health insurance schemes emerging in the province and elsewhere. '^* In establishing their 
own plan doctors were able maintain the autonomy they desired to protect while ensuring 
patients would receive and pay for necessary services. Further, the relative success of the 
program entrenched physician opposition to government involvement in areas of health 
insurance.^^
A provincial Royal Commission in 1947 inquiring into health and accident
insurance associations found that the majority of insurance options were beneficial for
clients. But the commission also reported several negative aspects of privately operated
plans including fraud, poor management and most importantly, on membership
restrictions that excluded a vast majority of the public. Based in part on public hearings,
the report concluded that
... throughout the Province it would seem apparent that the public 
generally are desirous of having some form of health insurance 
inaugurated either by the Provincial or Dominion Government on a 
contributory basis, and [one] cannot see any reason why this should not be
British Columbia, The Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into Health and Accident Insurance 
Associations Operating in the Province o f British Columbia. (Victoria: King’s Printer, 1947), DD8.
See Howard C. Shillington, The Road to Medicare in Canada (Toronto: Del Graphics, 1972) for a 
discussion on private, for profit, health insurance plans in Canada. While these plans were beneficial they 
were limited in that they were only available to individuals with the abihty to pay for coverage.
For a discussion on physician opposition to government sponsored plans see: H. Michael Stevenson and 
A. Paul Williams, “Physicians and Medicare: Professional Ideology and Canadian Health Care Policy,” 
Canadian Public Policy XI (1985): 504-521.
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accomplished, and particular in respect to hospitalization, under a similar
36plan to that recently embarked upon by the Province of Saskatchewan.
Despite the relative success of private schemes, it was clear that the public still viewed 
government involvement as essential in order to provided broad and comprehensive 
coverage to the population.
Despite setbacks during the 1930s the Liberals continued to support a provincial 
health insurance policy. According to D. Turnbull, Health and Welfare Minister in 1950, 
“the provinces were increasingly being approached for help by financially drained 
hospitals and municipalities.” Byron Johnson, provincial Minister of Health in 1947 
viewed health insurance as a solution to the problem. In the spring of 1948 the 
legislature passed an “Act to Provide for the Establishment of Hospital Insurance and 
Financial Aid to Hospitals” to be followed by the implementation of a health insurance 
program.^^ In January 1949, British Columbia became the second province in Canada to 
implement a non-profit, comprehensive, public hospital insurance plan.^* The Hospital 
Insurance Services Act provided public ward accommodations and hospital services 
including operations, x-rays, laboratory procedures, anaesthetics, dressings and certain 
prescribed drugs.^^ The provincial government financed the plan through premiums and 
contributions. In an effort to fulfill the comprehensive mandate the program required 
registration of the entire population, which proved to be an administrative nightmare. 
Specifically, persons subscribing to “approved,” non-profit, insurance agencies could be
^/W..DD9
A. Douglas Turnbull, “Memoir; Early Years of Hospital Insurance in British Columbia,” BC Studies (76) 
(1987-1988); 58-81.
^  Saskatchewan was the first province to establish a comprehensive health plan. For a discussion on the 
technical and programming difficulties associated with the British Colmnbia Hospital Insurance Service see
A. Douglas Turnbull.
British Columbia, "^Hospital Insurance for Everyone! A Guide to the Provincial Government Hospital 
Insurance Plan." (Victoria; Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1948).
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exempted from the provincial plans and their files were passed on to the requested 
insurer. Individuals remaining with a “non-approved” carrier were required to pay the 
designated premiums and remain registered in more than one plan. Social assistance 
recipients were exempted from premiums.'*®
Initially support for the plan was limited, a eonsequenee of complieated 
administrative procedures, high premiums, and competition from existing insurance 
agencies. In 1952, the new W.A.C. Bennett Social Credit government sought to revamp 
the program by abandoning the six month waiting period and lowering premiums while 
instituting a dollar per day user charge covering services without limit. Two years later 
premiums for hospital insurance were abolished, compensated by an increase of the social 
services tax from three to five percent. The combined effort attracted over 30,000 new 
subscribers.'** By the 1950s roughly ninety percent of the provincial population had 
coverage through either private or public plans.
While British Columbia struggled with the complexities of a suitable health 
insurance scheme, the federal government continued to investigate whether health 
concerns should be viewed as national in scope. In 1940 the Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Report), in line with the traditional 
interpretation of the BNA Act, sought to preserve provincial jurisdiction but 
recommended increased federal financial commitments. “The commission’s plan seeks 
to ensure to every province a real and not illusionary autonomy by guaranteeing to it free
Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions that Created the 
Canadian Health Insurance System (Montreal; McGill Queens, 1987), 168. Also see Howard C. 
Shillington, The Road to Medicare in Canada (Toronto: DEL Graphics, 1972) for further discussion on 
non-profit, prepayment, physician-sponsored plans.
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from conditions and control, the revenues necessary to perform those functions which 
relate closely to its social and cultural development^^ Accordingly the commissioners 
did not recommend health policies and insurance programs as initiatives viable for federal 
financial support. Specifically, “an enduring and deep rooted social malaise, which 
requires the mobilization of efforts on a nation wide scale to deal with it, is beyond the 
power of the Dominion unless it is compromised in the enumerated heads of Section 91. 
Generally the power to deal with these pressing social questions rests with the 
provinces."'*^ Furthermore, centralization would jeopardize regional differences and 
national unity. Specifically, from the Commissioners’ perspective the “Mere importance 
of a service does not justify its assumption by the Dominion.”'^
At the same time the commission recommended far reaching changes in federal- 
provincial fiscal relationships to foster greater coordination and alleviate some of the 
hardships experienced during the depression. Overall, the commission recognized a new 
division of government responsibilities wherein revenue exchange would foster emerging 
national objectives. Recommendations included establishing a national unemployment 
relief program, transferring the direct tax field to federal jurisdiction and establishing a 
national adjustment grant to reduce regional disparities .^  ^ The majority of the provinces, 
including British Columbia, opposed the findings voicing concerns over the transfer of 
taxation powers while the wealthier provinces rejected possible financial losses incurred 
through the adjustment grant system. Thus the report failed to generate significant
Quoted in Donald V. Smiley, “The Rowell-Sirous Report. Provincial Autonomy and Post -War Canadian 
Federalism,” in Peter J. Meekison, ed., Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 
1971), 67. [Authors emphasis.]
Taylor, 10.
31
changes, but foreshadowed the fiiture of federal-provincial relations. The sphere of 
national interests was growing and would, in time, be mirrored by a corresponding fiscal 
presence.
Only two years later an internal federal task force, the Advisory Committee on 
Health Insurance, drew up the first blue print for a national health insurance plan. The 
commissioners argued that public opinion demanded a national program structured within 
the existing constitution, where responsibilities for administering and providing health 
care would remain in provincial jurisdiction. Furthermore the plan would be compulsory, 
embrace the entire population, and foster preventative programs.^ Because a 
constitutional amendment was not an option. Grants in Aid were suggested to promote the 
nationwide expansion of health services. The task force findings were passed to a select 
special committee of Parliament for further examination. The committee supported the 
proposal recommending a national program funded through taxation and grants, an 
initiative added to the agenda of the upcoming post war conference on reconstruction.
Health insurance proposals also gained momentum, thanks to Leonard Marsh’s 
1943 report on Social Security for Canada favouring an extensive social safety net and the 
collective pooling of risks in response to the changing economic realities, brought on by 
massive industrialization, urbanization, and shifting social conditions. Marsh claimed,
“in modem economic life there are certain hazards and contingencies which have to be 
met, some of them completely unpredictable, some of them uncertain as to time but others 
reasonably to be anticipated. They may be met in hit- or -  miss fashion ... ; but we know 
from experience that, these problems or needs are always present at some place in the
 ^Ib id . 18.
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community or among the population”"*^ This perspective recognized an emerging 
national conscience where the welfare of individuals signified the development, 
advancement and prosperity of the state. Under the previous classic liberal view of 
society, private markets were pre-eminent and government had a limited role in altering 
production and the distribution of income, goods and services. This philosophy was 
countered by a new outlook favouring government intervention guided by a responsibility 
to protect and compensate their citizens.
Marsh’s views coincided with emerging economic theories, the most popular of 
which was modeled by British economist John Maynard Keynes. He claimed that high 
levels of employment, reasonable price stability and increased standards of living could 
be achieved through the manipulation of taxation and expenditures. Increased capital 
investment on various programs, combined with reduced taxation rates, would ultimately 
stimulate the economy, even if this meant incurring a deficit. In periods of economic 
prosperity surpluses were to be used to control and reduce debt accumulation. The theory 
justified an interventionist role of government and seemingly worked with the ebb and 
flow of the economy throughout the post-war years."**
Theory, however, was not the sole motivator of Liberal support for national health 
policies. In a letter to Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1943, Ian Mackenzie, national 
Minister of Health reiterated his electoral concerns about the future of the Liberal party. 
He commented, “What of the rise of socialism all across Canada? It was for years a
Quoted in Armstrong, 54.
^  Robert and Doreen Jackson, Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy, 5* 
ed. (Toronto; Prentice Hall, 2001), 521. Jackson noted that although “successive federal governments 
intervened to boost aggregate demand as an incentive to economic growth, they rarely followed Keynes’ 
prescriptions of expenditure cut backs and tax hikes to deflate the economy in time of expansion and 
inflation
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British Columbia and Saskatchewan freak but now it is definitely a national political 
menace.”'*^ Begrudgingly receptive to public demands, the federal Liberals joined all 
other federal parties to include health insurance proposals in their campaign platforms in 
stiff competition for public support. A Gallup poll conducted in 1944 asked if 
individuals would approve or disapprove of a National Health Plan where a flat monthly 
payment of complete medical and hospital care by the federal government? Eighty 
percent approved; five years later support had risen to 83 percent.^ *^
During the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction the federal 
government proposed financial participation in a comprehensive health insurance plan, 
offering to meet 60% of estimated costs as well as responsibility for old age pensions and 
unemployment assistance. However, in an effort to retain substantial tax sources 
acquired during the Wartime Tax Agreements, financial and administrative participation 
was contingent on provincial relinquishment of personal income and corporate tax fields, 
succession duties and several minor taxation fields. Following three days of 
deliberations control over taxation and financing continued to divide the two levels of 
government. In the end the three prairie provinces agreed to accept the entire deal. All 
the provinces were willing to cede personal and corporate taxes, but only six were willing 
to abandon succession duties. Unwilling to compromise the meeting was called; the 
proposals were shelved, foretelling of the continual set backs the program would endure. 
In a political manoeuvre demonstrating a federal commitment to health care, the
Quoted in Taylor, 35.
Naylor, 158.
Canada, Health, Welfare and Labour: Reference Book for Dominion-Provincial Conference on 
Reconstruction, (Ottawa; 1945). Note: the “60%” contribution was capped at $12.% per person. If 
government spent excessively their contribution could recede below the sixty percent mark.
The influence on intergovernmental tax arrangements on negotiations regarding social policies will be 
clarified and elaborated in the concluding portions of the chapter.
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previously contemplated Grants in Aid program was implemented supplying financial 
contributions for a variety of public health programs, training, education and hospital 
construction/^ Introduced in 1948, the grants fostered impressive new growth in the 
availability of health services, acting as a catalyst for developing health insurance 
programs.
Clearly, in the first half of the twentieth century provincial politicians exhibited a 
concerted effort to expand the social policy field on a variety of fronts regardless of the 
Dominion’s unwillingness to commit. In Cassidy’s view British Columbia was patiently 
waiting for a “comprehensive outline of a national system of social security ... [in order] 
to clear the way for really effective work on the provincial and local level.”^^  While the 
province continued to expand social services, public and political pressures spurred on 
federal involvement.
By the 1950s the establishment of a national health insurance program or, at 
minimum, a national hospital insurance scheme, had become a political necessity for 
three distinct reasons. Both levels of government had, to varying degrees, committed to 
expanding health services and inquiring into national insurance schemes. Second, public 
opinion had consistently demanded action on the policy front. Finally, the governing 
federal Liberals were becoming increasingly wary of growing support of the Canadian 
Commonwealth Federation and the Conservatives who were both committed to a national 
hospital insurance plan. Consequently, in 1956 at a Federal-Provincial Conference the
Federal Grants in Aid to the provinces increased from 7.8 million in 1948-49 to 50.3 million 1962-63. 
During the period 1948-62 British Columbia was eligible to receive 50 million in grants, but actually 
apphed and received 39.9 million. In 1972 the Grant in Aid program was terminated. See; Paul A.R. 
Hobson and France St. Hilaire, Reforming Federal Provincial Relations: Towards Sustainable Federalism 
(Institute For Research on Public Policy, 1993), 39.
Cassidy, 12.
Liberal government extended the grant in aid program to provinces enacting legislation 
for operation of hospital insurance programs. A year later the introduction of the Hospital 
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act followed, passing with a unanimous Commons 
vote. Under the Act the federal government would pay a fraction of defined sharable 
operating costs of hospital care. The calculation, cited as 50-50 cost-sharing, included 
two components. Twenty-five percent of costs were based on provincial expenditures 
and 25% were based on national average costs. Sharable costs covered normal operation 
and maintenance related to ward care and excluded capital expenses and additional costs 
attributable to semi-private and private ward care, uninsured portions of patient 
hospitalization, or provincial administrative overhead.
Although enacted the national plan was merely an enabling act. It was restricted 
by a clause requiring a majority of the population’s support, represented by the provinces. 
At the time British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Newfoundland had public 
universal insurance plans in place compatible with the national program, but represented 
less than a quarter of the country’s population. At a Federal Provincial Conference in 
1956 Premier W. AC. Bennett of British Columbia objected to the substantial majority 
concept:
British Columbia recommends that any province willing to participate in a 
health program should not be retarded by the refusal of others to 
participate; ... let this conference agree in principle upon the desirability of 
a health program adaptable to the requirements of the individual 
provinces; that such a plan make provision for medical, hospital, dental 
and pharmaceutical services; and that the federal government share 
equally in the costs of such health programs to the extent that they have 
been or may be adopted by a province to meet its special requirements.,.
55 Eric J. Hanson, Royal Commission on Health Services: The Public Finance Aspects o f Health Services in
Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963), 25.
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[We] will now enter into a program on a 50% basis with the national 
government,
Delivered on the eve of a federal election, provincial willingness to invest in a
national program failed to gain attention. In June 1957 Louis St Laurent’s Liberals lost to
the Conservatives. A year later Diefenbaker lifted the restriction allowing the western
provinces, Newfoundland and Manitoba to participate in cost-sharing as of 1 July 1958.
The other provinces and territories quickly followed suit.^^
As hospital insurance came to finition, a parallel dialogue regarding a national
medical care insurance program continued between the two levels of government.
Indeed, Justice Emmett Hall’s 1964 Royal Commission on Health Services recalled
fondly how a consensus on priorities contributed to a successful hospital insurance
scheme fimctioning within the framework of the constitution. Hall noted.
The program appears to be a sound blend of federal financial support and 
respect for provincial responsibility. In fact it goes beyond that for in its 
administration it utilizes a number of joint Federal-Provincial Committees 
and working parties. It is a remarkably successful example of what has 
been termed ‘cooperative federalism.’ *^
In Hall’s opinion hospital insurance was only a precursor to a more elaborate national
health insurance plan. Echoing the Marsh report’s articulation of a “national conscience,”
Justice Hall argued,
.. quite apart from humanitarian considerations, the health of Canadians is 
a concern to us as a nation, and no enlightened government can ignore that 
the economic capacity of its citizens to be productive depends upon their 
health and vigour as much as their educational attainment.... The best 
solution for Canada is the establishment of a comprehensive, universal 
health services program... Canada requires the establishment of health 
insurance funds, provincially administered, contributed to by the Federal
Quoted in Taylor, 214.
Ontario and Nova Scotia implemented plans in January 1959; New Brunswick July 1958; Prince Edward 
Island October 1959; Quebec 1961; North West Territories and Yukon 1960.
Justice Enunett Hall, Royal Commission on Health Services, (Ottawa; 1964), 413.
government from general revenue and by provincial governments as they 
may determine, structures along similar lines as the Hospital Insurance 
Program.
The Canadian Medical Association supported confining policy to subsidizing the vast
number of individuals unable to meet their health care costs. But Hall argued
subsidization could be potentially as costly as a national scheme, resulting in part fi'om
the massive administration required to conduct means testing on the Canadian public; a
practice he condoned as “inherently undemocrat ic.After  outlining a potential program
he rallied an impressive call to action;
This is what Canada and the provinces working together should do. It’s 
not an idealists dream but a practical program within Canada’s ability 
financially and practically... It’s what Canadians ought to strive for and 
expect through their governments. They should not be content with less.^^
Following Hall’s recommendations Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson called
another Federal-Provincial Conference in July 1965 to discuss a national scheme.
Pearson’s opening statement went straight to the heart of the delicate issue of jurisdiction;
Our constitution does not establish- no constitution can establish, except at 
the price of impractable rigidity- absolute distinctions between the 
functions and powers of our respective governments. Our responsibilities 
are mingled at different points. Our concerns overlap even more. In many 
areas, federal provincial governments are responsible for parallel action 
within their respective jurisdictions... The present government of Canada 
has clearly accepted the fact that many of the constitutional 
responsibilities of the Provinces are in areas of rapidly growing need... On 
that basis we will discuss to the best of our ability the responsibilities of 
national leadership which must be undertaken from the center and will 
require us to use our powers for the good o f all Canadians.^^
Specifically, in discussing health services he continued:
Quoted in L. Soderstrom, The Canadian Health Care System (London. Croon Helm, 1978), 160.
The Canadian Medical Association was particularly influential in shaping health policies. They had 
requested the establishment of a Commission to investigate Health Insmance confident that they would 
favour private non-profit plans.
“  —. Federal-Provincial Conference Ottcnva, July 19-22, 1965 (Ottawa; Queens Printer, 1968), 5. [Authors 
emphasis.]
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The item of our agenda which is most important of all, because it can most 
closely affect the daily lives of all Canadians, is the provision of health 
services... Accordingly, we have attempted... to inform ourselves... of the 
views of the provinces. [We are under the impression] that the provincial 
governments rank high among their objectives the establishment of a 
health services plan which will enable their residents to have access to 
comprehensive physician services on a prepaid basis. That, as I have said, 
is also the federal view... I believe that Canadian attitudes and Canadian 
economic standards have now developed to the point at which we are 
ready to regard Medicare as part of Canada’s basic social standard... In 
giving this undertaking I am not proposing a new cost shared program...
Rather, if the provinces established universal, portable, comprehensive and public
administrated systems, the federal government would be “prepared to accept
responsibility for an amount per capita of approximately one half of the national cost of
Medicare programs based on the proposed def ini t ion.This  initial federal commitment,
combined with a string of minority governments, forced politicians to address the social
envelope in the wake of growing public support for expanded social programs.
Similarly, in his opening statement Premier W A C Bennett reiterated a positive
attitude for intergovernmental relations and aspirations for Canada’s future.
This conference should lay the ground to achieve still greater progress in 
the near future and over the next twenty years in the economic and social 
well-being of all Canadians. There is every reason to be optimistic for the 
future of all regions of Canada, providing we foster a dynamic cooperative 
federalism to ensure full employment of our human and material resources 
and better educational, health, and humanitarian services for all people....
Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to assure you that British Columbia is prepared 
to co-operate fully with the Government of Canada in vital joint programs 
for national development.^^
In relation to medical services Bennett proclaimed “British Columbia endorses, without
15.
64 Ibid., 16. Note; cost-sharing for Medicare did not vary with provincial expenditures and thus was not 
termed “50/50” cost sharing.
Canada, Federal-Provincial Conference Ottawa, July 19-22, 1965 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1968). 77.
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reservation, the introduction of comprehensive medical services for all Canadians as soon 
as possible and irrespective of ability to pay, provided that the federal government will 
pay fifty percent of the costs By this time B.C. was anxiously waiting monies since
they had already established their own agency, the B.C. Medical Plan, insuring 
individuals or families unable to qualify for group coverage and subsidizing the premiums 
of low-income individuals.
Despite British Columbia’s favourable attitude their view was not representative 
of the several provinces which argued that even though joining was voluntary, the 
adoption of Medicare was a coercive measure since it would be extremely difficult for 
non-participating provinces to ignore the power of federal coffers. Those provinces 
opting out also risked support of their electorate who were still obligated to contribute to 
the new federal Social Development Tax, implemented to help fund the program, even 
though they would not receive benefits.^’ In addition to these pressures, the federal 
government sought to further entice and encourage consensus on the Medicare issue by 
introducing the Health Resources Fund in preparation for the new program. Commencing 
1 January 1966 federal dollars were allotted to the provinces to aid in meeting the capital 
costs of planning, construction and renovations alongside provision of training 
programs.^*
After enticing the provinces with significant health care investments the Minister 
of National Health and Welfare, Allan MacEachen - a devoted supporter of the plan.
Some provinces, particularly Ontario, were especially emaged about the Social Development Tax 
because they were investigating introducing such a tax at a provincial level. Note; The federal Social 
Development Tax did not actually become effective until 1969.
^  $400 million was given to the provinces on a per capita bases, $25 million to regional Atlantic projects, 
and $ 75 million for projects of national significance.
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brought forward a federal resolution for the introduction of Medicare on 12 July 1966. 
Arguing further delay would undermine the Liberals’ commitment to the program, he 
suggested a commencement date of 1 July 1967 -  Canada’s Centennial. As included in 
the earlier offer, federal funds were subject to the four principles with the definition of 
public administration extended to include non-profit private insurers operating in concert 
with the provincial government. Further, federal financial contributions included a per 
capita payment for provincial residents enrolled in the plan, equal to one-half of the 
national per capita cost. Notably, there was no consideration for actual provincial costs. 
But deep-rooted concerns from the Finance Minister, Mitchell Sharp, regarding the fiscal 
pressures associated with the bill lead cabinet to postpone the program for one year. But 
opinion polls continued to exhibit not only wide-spread popular support, but that 
Canadians were willing to pay for the new program. A poll conducted late in 1960 
reported that almost 6 of every 10 Canadians supported a comprehensive state medicare 
plan, even if it meant an increase in taxes.®^
Finally, despite acrimonious debate regarding finances in the cabinet on 
December 1966 the Medical Care Act was passed in the House of Commons, 177-2 in 
favour, effective I July 1968 British Columbia and Saskatchewan began programs on 
the commensuration date and by 1970 all of the provinces had instituted the program. 
After decades of discussion a comprehensive, national health insurance program had been 
achieved; the policy quickly became Canada’s most revered social program and most 
costly. The emergence of national health policies meant governments were willing to
Naylor. 191.
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Manitoba, April 1969; Alberta, July 1969; Ontario, October 1969; 
Quebec, November 1970; Prince Edward Island, December 1970, New Brunswick, January 1971; North 
West Territories, April 1971; Yukon 1972.
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invest in programs that Canadians deemed important, creating societal commitments and 
giving rise to wide spread public expectations that would be difficult to reverse. Unlike 
other social programs the benefits of health insurance would influence the life of every 
single Canadian. The significance of the program, combined with the willingness of 
Canadians to collectively finance such a vital endeavour, has meant health insurance has 
become a publicly perceived right. With a national program in place the test of ensuing 
years became balancing sound health care policy with emerging pressures for fiscal 
accountability and restraint.
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Chapter Two: Negotiating Funding
The founding of a comprehensive public health insurance system during the post­
war era was marked by a fairly cooperative atmosphere between Dominion and 
provincial governments, with each striving to establish a minimum level of health 
services for all Canadians. Guided by numerous Royal Commissions, Advisory 
Committees, public forums and national opinion polls, both levels of government 
responded to the needs and desires of the nation’s citizens. But by the late 1970s efforts 
to renegotiated fimding arrangements compromised the cooperative relationship. 
Controlling hospital and health insurance expenditures dominated governmental agendas, 
particularly at the federal level where spending was rapidly increasing. Motivated by a 
determination to limit these expenses the federal government shifted greater 
responsibility to the provinces by replacing the existing shared cost arrangements with 
block funding. Although deemed necessary by both levels of government, the parameters 
of the new arrangements set the stage for the future decentralization of health care 
services, and more specifically health care financing. While changes to the previous cost- 
sharing program initially failed to attract attention beyond the inner circles of 
government, the new arcane and complex formula further deterred public understanding 
of the transfer program. Even though the public continued to support the ideals of 
universally accessible health care they were excluded from understanding adjusted 
funding formulas and consequent reductions, creating a vacuum of knowledge necessary 
in comprehending imminent pressures and modifications to the health care system.
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Increasingly fiscal concerns became a powerful factor in shaping health care 
policies and reform as Finance Ministers, rather than Health Ministers, became 
prominent in shaping the future of health care in Canada.^ Moreover, the complex 
changes in fiscal arrangements, which have continually perpetuated the illusion of crisis 
between the central government and the provinces, were often closed to the public and 
even health ministers.^ This emerging “fiscal presence” guided the transition from cost- 
shared programs to the block-fimd formula known as the Established Programs and 
Financing Act (EPF) which effectively shifted all the risk for controlling both programs 
and rising costs to the provinces. The EPF provided the provinces enhanced flexibility in 
determining health priorities, but failed to define and guarantee federal long term 
financing obligations, allowing the federal government to redefine their fiscal role 
through a series of policy amendments in the following decades.
The complex nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations stems from a series of 
negotiated tax agreements created during the first half of the centuiy. Although tax 
arrangements may seem far removed from the establishment of health insurance and cost 
shared programs, they are vital in understanding friture developments in fiscal transfers. 
Under the BNA Act the provinces were allocated “Direct Taxation within the Province in 
order to raise revenue for Provincial Purposes,” most commonly defined as corporate and 
income taxes, although at the time of Confederation these tax bases were limited. The
' Ken Battle also felt policy change was increasingly driven by the Finance Department with little or no 
public consultation and debate. He argues that this federal policy style, “policy cliange by stealth.” 
emerged in the 1980s. See Ken Battle, “The Politics of Stealth. Child Benefits Under tire Tories,” in Susan 
D. Philhps ed., How Ottawa Spends 1993-1994: A More Democratic Canada...? (Ottawa; Carleton 
University Press, 1993), 417-448.
■ Monique Begin, Medicare: Canada's Right to Health (St. Catherine: Optimum, 1984), 6 J and 45.
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dominion government possessed taxation powers heavily weighted in its favour, 
empowered to gather revenues “by any Mode or System of Taxation.”
In desperate need of greater revenue during the First World War, the federal 
government requested and received from the provinces a limited amount of tax room in 
the direct tax fields. Consequently, in 1917 the federal government began imposing 
additional income taxes on individuals and corporations. The economic depression of the 
1930s fijrther legitimized the federal role, as the agent most capable of redistributing 
resources to reduce regional distress across the country, promoting federal domination of 
the post World War 1 tax system. Once again, under extreme financial constraint during 
World War II, the Wartime Tax Agreements were extended but this time the provinces 
refrained from collecting personal and corporate taxes in return for compensation, mainly 
unconditional revenue transfers and specific purpose transfers, allowing the central 
government a free rein.^ Eager to maintain these growing sources of revenue, the federal 
government proposed a continuation of the agreement after the war, despite the adamant 
protest from some provinces, particularly Ontario and Quebec. According to David 
Perry, by maintaining its presence the federal government “contradicted the implied 
principle that the provinces had exclusive use of the direct tax field...,” a principle so well 
established that the federal move was regarded as an “invasion of provincial taxing
 ^For example, as compensation B.C. accepted amounts equal to provincial and local revenues from the 
renounced taxes in the provincial fiscal year ending nearest to 31 December 1940. For a discussion on the 
history of tax arrangement in Canada see; Perrin Lewis, “The Tangled Tale of Taxes and Transfers,” in 
Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads: The Search For a Federal -  Provincial Balance (Vancouver: 
Fraser Institute. 1978), 39-102; or David B. Perry , Financing the Canadian Federation: 1867-1995 
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation Tax Paper 102, 1997).
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powers.”"* The prominence of direct taxes, originally designated to the provinces, had 
grown immensely during the war. For example, prior to the war income tax affected 
roughly 300,000 taxpayers, but by 1945 it had become a mass phenomenon collected 
from millions of Canadians, thus sparking competition between the two levels of 
government to secure access to these vital tax revenues.^
In an effort to appease the provinces while maintaining access to the direct 
taxation fields, the federal government initiated a series of post World War II piecemeal 
changes to taxation revenue sharing. The initial change was revealed in the new 
terminology of the Tax Rental Agreement which by the very term “rental” implied a 
federal recognition of the intrusion into provincial jurisdictional authority. Under the 
arrangement the provinces “rented” personal, corporate and death taxes, to the federal 
government for a period of five years. Eight provinces by 1949 accepted the offer. The 
federal government accommodated the position of Ontario and Quebec by allowing a 
credit for the limited personal and corporate income taxes they imposed.^
Further compensating the provinces, modifications to the Federal-Provincial 
Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1962 allowed the federal government to reduce its share of 
direct taxes. The previous tax rental agreement was replaced by tax collection 
arrangements, underlying the present system. The provinces could now obtain revenues
^David B. Perry, Financing the Canadian Federation: J867-1995 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation Tax 
Paper 102, 1997), 11.
' J. Harvey Perry, A Fiscal History o f  Canada (Canadian Tax Foundation, Tax Paper No. 85, 1989), 278.
 ^/hid, 383 . In 1955, continued complaints from the provinces desiring recovery of tax room was eased by 
a standard abatement of personal income and corporate taxes, set at 7 and 5 percent respectively. Tax room 
allocated to the provinces gradually increased in the following years. Also see: Paul A. R. Hobson and 
Robin W. Broadway, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation 
Tax Paper No. 96, 1993) or A.W. Johnson, “Federal- Provincial Fiscal Relations: An Historical 
Perspective,” in Thomas J. Courchene, David W. Conklin, and Gail C.A. Cook eds., Ottawa and the 
Provinces: The Distribution o f Money and Power, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985), 114 - 
123.
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through their own legislation which, if uniform with the federal act, would be collected
for the provinces while the national government absorb the administrative costs/ But the
actual tax transfer remained minimal, allowing the federal government to expand and
finance national social policies.
In a brief presented in 1963, British Columbia Premier W A C. Bennett reiterated
provincial arguments in stating that
the bargain made by the Provinces at Confederation to surrender their 
powers of indirect taxation, representing four fifths of their revenues, for per 
capita or fixed subsidies, quickly forced them to use their exclusive powers 
of ‘direct taxation within the Province’ under section 92 of the British North 
America Act. Sole provincial use of income taxes as respected by the 
Federal Government for 50 years preceding World War I. Federal entry in 
1917 was explained as a temporary action in a time of national emergency.
In the emergency of World War II the provinces gave temporary 
control of income taxes to Canada, . . . but it was clearly understood that the 
provinces would again exercise their ftill taxation rights in peace time... the 
centralist theories have lingered on to influence succeeding national 
administrations, which have returned to the provinces less than 20% of the 
personal and corporate tax fields... .This reluctance of the Federal 
Government to recognize provincial taxation rights, combined with public 
pressures on the Provinces to meet their constitutional responsibilities, has 
led to the large scale substitution of national equalization and conditional 
grant payments to the Provinces. *
In Bennett’s opinion the existing financial arrangements were not filling the fiscal gap
resulting from limited revenues and increased expenditures bought on by the expansion
of social programs. Specifically, in regard to establishing medical care insurance he
argued “Canada and the Provinces should be sharing equally in the public costs.
Bennett’s assertion was expressed by the earlier 1960 Royal Commission on Health
’ Note: At the initiation of the program the tax abatement to the provinces was equivalent to 13%, by 1967 
it had grown to 24%. See A.W. Johnson, 115.
* Premier W.A.C. Bennett, Brief Presented to the Plenary Session o f the Federal-Provincial Conference 
(Ottawa, 25 November 1963), 3.
7.
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Services which claimed that “only the federal government [had] the resources to deal 
with health matters on a national scale.. Thus, while the provinces continually argued 
for a greater share in the direct tax field, a federal presence could be justified as long as 
they remained committed to national programs.
Clearly, the provinces experienced substantial losses in their direct taxation 
powers although they were compensated through a variety of extensive fiscal transfers 
supporting provincial policies and programs. At the same time the federal government 
was fulfilling its national objectives. After all, according to A.W. Johnson the Parliament 
of Canada has the “power to achieve national objectives by the familiar device of 
financing the establishment and maintenance... of nation wide programs. Parliament is, 
after all the nationally elected representative of .. Canadians and therefore best able to 
perceive the ‘national interest... By the late 1960s fiscal transfers included 
equalization, health, education, welfare, unemployment, pensions and a variety of 
specific grants to persons. However, in the decades that followed, as these programs 
became more expensive, fiscal responsibilities were shifted back to the provinces through 
block-funding and renewed taxation powers.
Despite these developments not all the provinces favoured joint fixnding in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction. Quebec vigorously argued for renewed provincial funding 
capacity and control over social programs.** In 1965 the federal government proposed
Johnson 141. Johnson also recognizes an opposing point of \aew.
" A long history of French-English conflict has left francophones suspicious and opposed to federal 
policies in areas of provincial jurisdiction The late 1950s marked tlie beginning of the “Quiet Revolution” 
where Quebec nationalism fuelled provincial policies that challenged Canadian federalism and the “veiy 
existence of the Canadian state.” For a discussion on Quebec nationalism and the historical rational for 
hostile federal - provincial political relations see; Robert and Doreen Jackson, Politics in Canada: Culture, 
Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy, 5'  ^ed., (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001), 224-249.
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the Interim Arrangements Act allowing provinces to “opt-out” out of several 
“established” programs, implying that these programs would remain intact without 
federal domination, provided the conditions of the programs were upheld. Only Quebec 
“opted” to receive tax room to raise revenues for various social programs. According to 
George E. Carter, although only one province had opted out, “the 1965 provision made 
the future role of shared cost programs in the other nine provinces a matter of some 
speculation... ” The agreement foreshadowed 1967 federal tax transfers to the provinces 
and, more significantly, the 1977 Established Programs and Financing Act which 
replaced shared-cost grants for health and higher education. But as time would reveal 
most provinces were reluctant to abandon cost-sharing arrangements for tax room and 
block-funding, fearing future reductions in the federal financial commitment.
Originally, cost-sharing arrangements seemingly fit in establishing a national 
health insurance system, permitting both parties to achieve a basic level of health services 
nationwide. The provinces were able to develop programs beyond their fiscal capacity, 
enticed by federal dollars. In return, the federal government could claim a national 
program and impose minimum standards. The cost-sharing formula also recognized the 
broader argument of “spill-over effects,” justifying federal financial involvement because 
benefits were mobile and contributed to the nation as a whole.
However, almost immediately after the inception of a comprehensive national 
health insurance scheme, concerns surfaced over the rapidly rising costs of the program.
George E. Carter, Financing Health and Post-Secondary Education: A New Complex Fiscal 
Arrangement (Toronto: Canadian Tax Journal, Tax Paper No. 5., 1977), 536.
Allan M. Maslove and Bohodar Rubashewsky, “Cooperation and Confrontation: The Challenges of 
Fiscal Federalism,” in Michael Prince ed.. How Ottawa Spends 1986-1987: Tracking the Tories (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1986), 96.
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Specifically, with the introduction of two new health programs federal health 
expenditures had risen from $3.3 billion in 1965 to over $11 billion a decade later.*'* 
While actual expenditures were obviously expanding, as a percentage of the Gross 
National Product health care spending remained stable at around seven percent until the 
late 1970s.*  ^ The main fear in the ensuing years was that expenditures would soon 
surpass economic growth. These concerns coincided with growing fiscal neo 
conservatism in government circles, preaching privatization, reductions in government, 
increased competition through deregulation, and tax cuts to stimulate the economy, all 
driven by growing interest to control the national debt.
A Federal Provincial Committee on Health Care Costs in 1969 suggested that the 
shared-cost system of financing, where federal contributions were linked to provincial 
spending, was actually facilitating the rapid rise in costs. Author Gwendolyn Gray 
argued that cost-sharing provided little incentive for the provinces to develop alternate 
services that may have proved more efficient or cost-effective because new initiatives, 
such as home care, would have to be funded at provincial expense.*^ But to the extent 
that was true, many of the provinces were equally frustrated by the inflexible nature of 
the cost-sharing formula.
Released in British Columbia, the 1973 Foulkes Report recommended greater 
control over funding in order to increase efficiency in the health care field and develop
Gwendolyn Gray, Federalism And Health Policy: The Development o f Health Systems in Canada and 
Australia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 131.
Gross National Product indicates growth of tlie state and the economy. The GNP totals all costs arising 
in production and measures market value of all goods and services in the current period by Canadian 
factors of production. It is equal to wages and salaries, profits, interest, net rent net income on of farm and 
non-farm unincorporated businesses, indirect taxes (less) subsidies, capital consumption allowances, and 
miscellaneous valuation adjustments.
Monique Begin, Medicare: Canada's Right to Health Care (Montreal: Optimiun Publishing, 1984). 16. 
' ’ Gray, 11.
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provincial priorities through rationalization.'* Although the broad recommendations
were largely dismissed, the report indicated that the province was not sitting idly by
unconcerned over improving the efiRciency and effectiveness of the health care system.
Speaking in the British Columbia legislature in 1973, Social Credit ML A, Robert
McClelland, asked New Democratic Health Minister Dennis Cocke.
What kind of pressure is the Minister putting on the federal government to 
help us develop new programs?... much of the delay, much of the concern, 
much of the problem in developing these new programs is a reluctance on 
the part of the federal government to involve itself in cost-sharing for some 
of these new ideas...
In response Cocke recognized that renewing and diversifying the federal cost-sharing
agreements would be virtually an impossible request, stating.
The member from Langley said, ‘put pressure on the feds, put pressure on 
them to get better cost sharing.’ I don’t know what else we can do. I visited 
with the Ottawa people with our Premier and the Minister of Finance.
We’ve done everything we can. We’ve told our story over and over and 
over again ... it’s not going the direction that you’re suggesting it should go 
and that I am suggesting it should go. .. truly they’re trying to withdraw.^"
Frustrated, provincial governments were facing pressures to reorganize health delivery,
reduce costs and restructure federal-provincial frinding arrangements.
The sense that the federal government was wanting to redefine fiscal
arrangements dates back to 1971 when national Health Minister Marc Lalonde, eager to
control expenditures, proposed replacing cost-sharing with conditional block-funding
subject to the maintenance of national standards. The offer consisted of a cash
contribution, based on 1970-71 figures, increasing at the same rate as the GNP. Further,
See^ Citizens Guide to the “Foulkes” Report (Vancouver; Social Planning and Review Council of B.C., 
1974).
B.C. Legislative Assembly, Hansard (Victoria: 30*Parliament 4* session, 25 March 1974 vol.3, no. 1), 
1588.
1601.
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a “thrust fund” of thirty dollars per capita would be allocated to the provinces on a one­
time basis to assist in the reorganization of health care delivery. The provinces were 
reluctant to accept the offer arguing that funding based on the GNP escalator would be 
insufficient to support increasing program costs.^* British Columbia continued to be 
leery of any proposals deviating from guaranteeing fifty-fifty formula.^^ According to 
Cocke the federal offers were too restrictive. Specifically,
tying escalation to the gross national product would be the most restricting.
That’s why at the present time we’ve said, ‘we don’t want any change until 
such time as you can come up with something better than what we have, as 
opposed to something less advantageous than we have at the present time.’
So that’s our position. Our position is well known and will continue on that 
course.^^
Receiving meagre enthusiasm from the first report, in 1973 Lalonde presented an 
inadequately revised proposal. Soon after its release federal Finance Minister John 
Turner stepped up discussions to find a solution to the funding dilemma. Turner’s 
proposal, contingent on unanimous provincial acceptance, offered a combination of per 
capita grants, personal and corporate income tax points and federal withdrawal of various 
excise taxes and duties. At a Federal -  Provincial Finance meeting in July of that year. 
Turner proposed five options;
(1) Entire contribution in cash subject to conditions.
(2) 66 percent in cash plus 8 points personal income tax and 1 point corporate
taxable income.
Peny, 238.
Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta favoured changes to the cost-sharing financing arrangements. But rather 
than per capita funding they preferred a fiill transfer in tax points. In 1972 only Newfoundland and Ihince 
Edward Island were willing to accept the proposal. Tlie following year national minister of health and 
welfare, Marc Lalond, presented a revised proposal. See David B. Perry, Financing the Canadian 
Federation. 1867-1995 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, Tax Paper 102), 238-239., or R J. Van Loon, 
‘Trom Shared Costs to Block Funding and Beyond: The Politics of Health Insurance in Canada,” in Carl A. 
Meiliche and Janet Storch eds.. Perspectives on Canadian Health and Social Services Policies: History and 
Emerging Trends (Michigan: Health Administration Press, 1980), 348.
^  B.C. Legislative Assembly, (25 March 1974), 1601.
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(3) 50 percent cash, 8.5 points of personal income tax, 1 point corporate tax and 
50 percent of federal excise duties and taxes on tobacco and alcohol.
(4) 50 percent cash, 12.5 personal income tax points, and 1 point of corporate 
taxable income.
(5) 33 percent cash, 12 points of personal income tax, 1 point corporate taxable 
income, and fifty percent of federal excise duties and taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol. "^*
Again, total federal contributions would be based on the national average per capita 
contribution of an unspecified year. While provincial reactions were mixed, British 
Columbia continued to support the existing cost-sharing arrangement or a straight 
transfer of tax points as endorsed by Alberta, Ontario and Quebec. The federal 
government argued that rendering the entire compensation in tax points would 
compromise their influence on programs. Although some provinces were receptive to 
changes in the funding formula, they were unenthusiastic about the proposal. Insufficient 
compensation and fear of reduced federal influence topped the list of concerns. In the 
fall of 1974 the provinces formally rejected the proposals.
As negotiations continued the provinces faced greater pressures to advance a new 
funding formula. In 1975 the Federal government gave formal notice of intent to 
terminate the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act in 1980. Further, the 
federal government limited the growth rate of per capita contributions for Medicare from
Perry (Tax Paper No. 102), 239. An income tax point is defined a 1 percent of basic federal tax. A 
corporate income tax point represents one percent of federal taxable income. Under the 1972 tax 
agreement the provinces rationalized their tax base with that of the federal government and the federal 
personal income tax base was defined as 100 tax points, of which the provinces have received a percentage 
of this basic federal tax.
^  Dollars distributed through tax points are not program specific and difficult to track. Cash transfers, 
however, provide the federal government with fiscal leverage to influence programs because they are able 
to withliold funds if the provinces are not compl>ing with specific standards.
For further discussion on provincial reactions to the Lalonde and Turner proposals see. Perry (Tax Paper 
102), 240-243. “Lalonde Plan Has No Takers”, Victoria Daily Colonist, 25 May 1973 and “Premiers Shy 
Over Tax Offer,” Victoria Daily Colonist, 15 June 1976.
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13 percent in 1976-77, down to 8.5 percent in 1978-79.^’ Frustrated by the cuts and eager 
to negotiate an agreement that would account for expenditures accumulated under the 
Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, the appeal of using equalized tax points 
was becoming more apparent to the provinces.
A week before the June 1976 first ministers’ conference. Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau outlined the basic principles underlining the Establish Programs Financing 
(EFP) in letters to the provinces acknowledging that ''the federal government should 
continue to pay a substantial share o f program costs, in order to maintain national 
standards.”
(2) Federal payments should be calculated independently of provincial 
program expenditures, in order both to avoid distortion of priorities and 
provide greater certainty for both levels of government. (3) The per capita 
federal payments should be more nearly equal across the provinces a change 
that would work to the advantage of poorer provinces). (4) The 
arrangements should be put on a more permanent footing, in order to 
facilitate long-term planning by both levels of government. (5) There should 
be provision for continuing federal-provincial consultation and cooperation 
in health care and post-secondary education.
While the Prime Minister attempted to ease concerns over federal withdrawal, it was
apparent that a new financing formula was becoming inevitable.
At the same time it was formally proposed to combine the new negotiations with 
those for federal-provincial fiscal arrangements, effectively moving funding negotiations 
from involving ministers of health to an exclusive discussion between ministers of
The effect of imposed ceilings on the rate of growth of federal transfers was very limited because a new 
fiscal arrangement was reached, implemented in 1977.
^  Tax points would have to be equalized to a specified value, such as the national average, because tax- 
points yield less revenue in low income verses high income provinces.
Perry, 242. My emphasis. Also see Elliot Trudeau, “Established Programs Financing; A Proposal 
Regaring the Major Cost Shared Programs in the Fields of Health and Post Secondary Education,” in J. 
Peter Meekison ed., Canadian Federalism Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen, 1977), 248.
54
finance. According to author Richard Van Loon, during the final negotiations there was 
“little attention to the health field” and there were no meeting of federal provincial health 
ministers to consider the final formula.^” Van Loon argues that “once medical programs 
become large public finance concerns, health services experts become less influential in 
the highest level of decisions and power passes to public financial specialists, provincial 
treasurers, federal finance ministers, and the premiers, prime ministers and their 
advisors.” In the hands of the finance ministry, health content became subordinate to 
fiscal priorities. Further, the negotiations and new arrangements were discussed, decided 
and implemented beyond a public forum.
The offer hammered out at the first ministers’ conference and a subsequent 
meeting of finance ministers and treasurers in July 1976 proposed a single fiinding 
scheme for three programs: education, medicare, and hospital insurance. The provinces 
agreeing to spend the funds in the designated fields, would receive a contribution 
consisting of two parts, cash and tax room, growing independently of provincial 
expenditures. The cash portion would increase at the same rate as the GNP. A levelling 
adjustment would bring the per capita payment to the same level, for all provinces, over a 
five year period. Transferred tax room would be equalized to the national average. 
Further a transitional payment would be available to provinces whose cash and equalized 
tax transfer fell short of the amount it would have received had the whole entitlement 
been paid in cash.^  ^The legislation would also require three years’ notice for any 
changes, which would not be entertained until after the first two years of the program.
Van Loon. 350. 
A, j., 352.
32 Perry, 245 or Broadway, 46.
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Considering the lack of consensus between the provinces the chances for acceptance 
seemed slight.
In the British Columbia legislature politicians continued to argue for the
maintenance of 50/50 cost sharing. Both sides of the House spoke to growing concerns
over the impending changes. From the government’s perspective. Premier Bill Bennett
reiterated that the federal government had “entered cost-sharing arrangements in health,
based on the principle of sharing actual costs on an average of 50 percent across [the]
country” and that British Columbia was concerned over “abandonment of the 50 percent
principle. Opposition leader Dave Barrett believed the appeal of tax point transfers
was growing, yet he was unconvinced the new formula would be a fair trade for 50/50
cost sharing, stating,
I don’t believe that any body is moving in the tax point area for any other 
reason than to get the best possible deal for their jurisdiction. I applaud that.
But sometimes when pursuing the best possible tax deal for the jurisdiction 
you represent you miss the whole. I feel very strongly that any 
abandonment of the 50 percent cost-sharing of healthcare... will mean an 
abandonment of the high level of services to the Maritimes and 
Newfoundland and other Canadians. The safest course to go, in my 
opinion,... is not to tamper with the 50/50 cost-sharing deal. :.. So, Mr 
Premier, I say you’ve found they wish to back out. I say let us not abandon 
-  that is our position... regardless of rising cost 50-50 down the line. That’s 
the only way we will keep this country together.^"^
While politicians voiced valid concerns over the new offers, arguably the real concern
was that the provinces would be shouldering all the risk in controlling both programs and
costs.
Finally, provincial ministers of finance and treasures met in September and
British Columbia Legislative Assembly, Hansard (Victoria: 3 Parliament, Vol. 4, No. 10. 16 June 
1976), 2716.
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October 1976 to articulate a consensus on the ftinding issue. Alberta’s Treasurer Merv 
Leitch, presented a proposal on behalf of the provinces at the Meeting of Ministers of 
Finance and Provincial Treasures in Ottawa the following December. Accepting many 
prior recommendations, the provinces nonetheless forwarded three requests. First, they 
wanted contributions to be based on the highest transfers from the 1975-76 fiscal year. 
Second, that transfers be equalized to the province with the highest yield, rather than to 
the national average which had previously been proposed.^^ This would potentially allow 
all the provinces to achieve the same standard of per capita program expenditure as the 
province with the highest standard. Finally, the provinces proposed equal per capita cash 
payments, escalated in accordance with a three-year moving average of the GNP, to 
provide stable growth of federal contributions in line with the economy.
Receptive to the provincial offer the federal government tacked on a $20 per capita 
extended health care grant contingent on the integration of the Hospital Insurance 
prograni into the new formula.^^
In the end the provinces accepted the federal argument that tax points be 
equalized to the national average, rather than to the level of the highest province.
Further, the federal government tacked on two additional personal income tax points, one 
to be paid in cash and one in tax, to replace the 1972 income tax revenue guarantee.
The provinces wanted 1 point corporate taxable income and 12.5 points of personal income tax. The one 
point corporate taxable income and 4.357 points of the personal income tax represented tax room already 
allocated to the provinces in lieu of post-secondary education transfers in 1967-72 arrangements.
The Provincial Proposal is included in the appendix of the British Columbia Budget delivered January 
1977.
The extended health care grant replaced some cost shared programs previously covered by the Canada 
Assistance Plan.
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bringing the total tax transfer to 13.5.^* Transitional cash payments were also offered 
where provinces received less than they would have had the entire payment been in 
cash/^ As a high income province, where a large tax base existed to cover any variations 
in cash, British Columbia would not be a recipient of transitional payments. Further, 
“levelling” attempted to even out variations existent under the previous cost sharing 
arrangements. Provinces that received per capita payments above the national average, 
including British Columbia, would be levelled down over five years; provinces below the 
national average would be levelled up over three years. Finally, the provinces were no 
longer subjected to intrusive federal auditing and reporting requirements under the 
previous Hospital and Medicare Act. After years of negotiations, by the end of December 
1976 new fiscal arrangements were nearing completion.
The actual amount to be redistributed to the provinces would be calculated 
through the following formula outlined in the 1977 Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangement and Established Programs and Financing Act:
Basic Cash= Base Year Contribution Per Capita + 7.63 x escalator x population
2
Provincial Entitlement= EPF Cash + Tax Transfer 
EPF Cash = Basic Cash + Transitional Payment +/- levelling adjustments 
Base Year Contributions = the federal per capita transfer in the 1975-76 year 
($212.65 divided by in half $133.59) (7.63 = cash value of one personal income 
tax point given as compensation for the revenue guarantee)
Escalator = three year moving average of nominal GNP per capita 
Tax Transfer =13.5 personal + 1 corporate equalized tax point.
38 In realitj" the provinces received a tax transfer of 9.143, since 4.357 had been transferred under previous 
arrangements for post-secondary education. Tlie revenue guarantee was included in the 1972 tax reforms 
to encourage the provinces to rationalize their income tax systems with the federal government. The 
revenue guarantee provided funds for any loses the provinces may experience as a result of reforming tlieir 
tax system. Once the provinces became familiarized with tlie new system they were expected to adjust 
their tax rates to compensate for any differences. See the January 1977 British Columbia Budget for a 
discussion on revenue guarantee issue.
As the value of tax points exceeded the cash payments, transitional payments were expected to diminish 
over time. Transitional payments became obsolete in tlie new Established and Programs and Financing Act 
of 1982.
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The complexity of the new arrangements left all but a few financial experts in the dark. 
Not surprisingly taxpayers have become increasing bewildered by the source of revenue 
distribution. The complex nature of fiscal arrangements, and the elite realm of decision 
makers involved, effectively left the public shut out. Indeed, according to Thomas 
Courchene, as was “the case with most-federal provincial negotiations, the Canadian 
public (parliament included) was not privy to the nature and substances of much that 
formed the essence of the renegotiations.Specifically, “public opinion was not 
brought to bear on the new arrangements.”"^  ^ A survey of major newspapers distributed 
throughout British Columbia revealed that information and debate regarding new fiscal 
arrangements rarely attracted media attention."^  ^ In fact, the few articles printed either 
incorrectly lumped a number of fiscal transfers together in explaining the new program or 
failed to explain how the new program would operate. Further, there was virtually no 
debate on how the new program could affect health care delivery in the province in the 
future. Rather, reactions of “irked” provincial leaders and retaliations by the 
“dictatorship” topped the limited headlines. With little public reaction or concern the 
province quietly entered into a new cost-sharing program.
In concluding the new funding arrangements in December 1976, federal Health 
Minister Marc Lalonde summed up the benefits of the program by claiming that the 
amalgamation of the Hospital Insurance and Medical Care programs into the Established 
Programs Financing Act would create three very important results. First, the move to
Thomas J. Courchene. “The New Arrangements and the Economics of Federalism,” in Options: 
Proceedings o f  the Conference on the Future o f  the Canadian Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
October 1977). 312.
345.
Papers surveyed included the Vancouver Sun, The Province and the Prince George Citizen over the 
period from May 1976 to January 1978.
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block-funding would substantially increase provincial flexibility with regard to program
coordination and delivery as well as further simplify administrative procedures. Second,
savings generated by reducing services would accrue totally to the provinces and would
not be shared by the federal government since their contribution under established
programs would not be directly related to program costs. Third, the Established
Programs formula would yield more resources to the provinces than a continuation of
existing arrangements for health and post-secondary education programs.
Lalonde further added.
The objective of moving away from detailed administrative arrangements 
should not be interpreted as a complete elimination of either the health 
program conditions or the need to work cooperatively in the exchange of 
data and information for statistical planning and purposes. The federal cash 
contribution would continue to be conditional upon provinces meeting broad 
health program conditions of the type currently embodied in the Medical 
Care Act. ^
However, some onlookers disagreed with this assessment. Could the conditions of 
universality, portability, comprehensiveness, and publicly administered programs be 
maintained if there were no legislated enforcement mechanisms in the EFP program? 
Historian Malcolm Taylor thought not, claiming “the new arrangements marked the end 
of a national program as the format of conditional grant in aid [was] abandoned."^ 
Writing in the wake of the deal, Courchene felt some conditions” still remained. But in 
his view, “these standards will turn out to be unworkable let alone capable of being
Quoted in Alistair Thompson, Federal Support For Health Care: A Background Paper (Ottawa; HEAL, 
June 1991), 17.
"'"'Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions that Created the 
Health Insurance System and Their Outcomes (Montreal. McGill-Queens, 1987), 487. [Author’s 
emphasis.]
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defined, so that for all intents and purposes the grants are unconditional.”'*^ Indeed, 
during the 1970s implementation of user fees and extra billing expanded in many of the 
provinces, leading some commentators to argue that accessibility and portability of 
benefits were being threatened."*  ^As a result, the federal government had to review and 
institute policies in the early 1980s outlining financial penalties for provinces failing to 
ensure the four principles of Medicare were met. Had the program truly been conditional 
in nature these measures would never have been deemed necessary."*^
Despite the efforts to negotiate a new funding arrangement, it appeared that the 
two levels of government would continue to dispute funding obligations and 
commitments. Shortly after institution of the EPF the provinces once again reasserted 
their view that the cash component was the only source of federal funding for established 
programs. Although roughly eight tax points were transferred by the federal government 
intended to cover health spending, the provinces have historically argued these tax 
revenue sources had always belonged to them. Correspondingly, Paul Boothe argues 
“the federal government’s rhetoric claiming that it is ‘giving’ the provinces this revenue
Thomas J. Courchene. “The New Arrangements and the Economics of Federalism,” in Options: 
Proceedings o f the Conference on the Future o f the Canadian Federation (Toronto, Universit)' of Toronto, 
October 1977), 337. [Author’s emphasis.]
Although accurate information was not recorded regarding user fees and extra billing, it is estimated that 
hospital user fees grew from 6.6% in 1977 to 9.4% in 1981. Over the same period extra billing rose from 
4% to 4.3%. The implementation of additional charges varied throughout the provinces, but in Ontario, 
Alberta and Nova Scotia user fees were extensive enough to be “considered a problem.” Alberta set an 
alarming precedent in 1984 allowing hospitals to levy charges of up to 20$ per day or $150 per patient.
This trend was abated the same year by the institution of the Canada Healtli Act. See; Malcolm C. Brown, 
“Health Care Financing and the Canada Health Act,” Journal o f Canadian Studies (Volume 21, 1986). 
123-125.
‘* Tn 1984 the Federal government instituted the Canada Health Act tying user fees and extra billing to 
dollar for dollar reduction in cash funding. The Canada Health Act will be addressed in the following 
chapter. See; Canada Health Act Annual Report, (Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada, 1984); Monique 
Begin, Medicare: Canada's Right to Health Care (Montreal: Optimiun Publishing, 1984); Monique Begin, 
The Future o f Medicare: Recovering the Canada Health Act (Ottawa: Canadian Center for Polic) 
Alternatives, 1999); or Odette Madore, The Canadian Health Act: Overview and Options (Ottawa: Library 
of Parliament Research Branch, 1995).
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anew each year strains credulity.”'** Specifically tax points are difficult to claim as a 
federal transfer because they are calculated as provincial tax, thus not included as a 
federal revenue or expenditure calculation. Further tax revenues enter into general 
revenues and cannot be subject to conditions.'*^ Consequently, it appeared heading into 
the 1980s that the fiscal battles between the two levels of government would continue to 
be debated well into the ensuing decade.
The EPF marked a new era of federal -  provincial fiscal relations. Initially, the 
new fiscal arrangement seemed positive in allowing the provinces greater incentive and 
flexibility for effective health care delivery. On the flip side however, according to 
economist Robert Evans, “it also gave them all the risk.” “^ The provinces were left with 
the responsibility to juggle rising expenditures while economic growth was beginning to 
decline in the early 1980s. By the end of the decade the provinces were feeling the 
repercussions of federal fiscal restraint measures. Given that transfers had increased 
unexpectedly during the first four years of the program, it is fair to suggest that the intent 
and purpose of the new arrangement was not to facilitate fiscal decentralization. 
However, emerging economic pressures and shifting political agendas, combined with 
federal ability to adjust the policy, lead to a series of unilateral cuts to fiscal transfers 
during 1980s and 1990s. As time progressed and incessant changes to the EPF were 
initiated, the federal fiscal role transformed. Consequently, while the new block formula
Paul Boothe and Barbara Johnston. Stealing the Emperors Clothes: Deficit Offloading and National 
Standards in Health Care (C.D. Howe Institute, No. 41, 1993), 7.
Under the EFP cash transfers are directly deposited into provincial general revenues where specific 
transfer dollars are not tracked. Under the agreement the federal government provided a basic breakdown 
of spending with 17.4% designated to Medicare, 50.5% for hospital insurance, and 32.1% for post­
secondary education.
Robert Evans, Hiding Behind Medicare: Health Care Funding in the B.C. Budget (Vancouver; B.C. 
Economic Policy Institute, 1984), 15.
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qualified as a reasonable compromise to the fiinding dilemma at the time, the evolution 
of the EPF resulted in less than equitable fiscal partnership.
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Chapter Three: Compromising the System
In an examination of American and Canadian health care systems, a Common 
Wealth Fund study in 1988 revealed that 43 percent of Canadians thought their system 
had hmdamental flaws.' When asked the same question in 2001 this number swelled to 
77 percent. While the study fails to pinpoint specific issues of public concern, it does 
document a growing dissatisfaction among Canadians with their health care system. 
While these “flaws,” such as waitlist and staffing shortages, are most noticeable at the 
local level, these concerns are repercussions of unilateral funding cuts to health transfers 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, Canadians have become more and more 
acquainted with fiscal restraint policies and how they perpetuate a sense of crisis, but few 
understand the historical development of a diminishing federal role.
Heading into the 1980s Canadians were increasingly concerned with issues of 
health eare delivery, particularly accessibility and availability of services, fi-amed by the 
ongoing controversy over user fees and extra billing. The rancorous debate over these 
two issues was not exclusively tied to earlier changes in the funding formula, but various 
interpretations by the provinces alleging declining federal funding led some to claim that 
excessive costs were driving them to apply revenue generating measures. Now that the 
provinces retained all the responsibility for program delivery, condoning user fees and 
extra billing appeared to be at their prerogative; especially since the Established 
Programs and Financing Act (EPF) arrangement failed to outline any penalties for 
provinces neglecting to uphold the four principles of Medicare. In an effort to deter the
* Antonia Maioni and Pierre Martin, Crisis? What Crisis? Canadians Ponder the State o f Their Health 
Care System (Syracuse: Campbell Public Affairs Institute, 2002).
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provinces from breeching these principles, the Federal government instituted the Canada 
Health Act [CHA] in 1984, which tied user fees and extra billing to dollar for dollar 
reductions in cash transfers. At the same time the CHA attempted to eliminate these 
practices, it emphasised the value of the cash component of the transfer as provincial 
governments and the public became attuned to possible penalties and reductions to 
transfers, which in time ultimately compromised local service delivery. While the debate 
regarding user fees, extra billing and the impending Canada Health Act was primarily 
about health care delivery, it also coincided with changing federal attitudes to limit 
expenditures in order to achieve deficit reduction goals.^ Two opposing pressures were 
emerging: on one hand the provinces were coerced into maintaining the availability of 
universal health care, while at the same time being antagonized by a federal desire to 
reduce and control expenditures.
Assuming power in 1984, Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives 
implemented their agenda to reduce the federal deficit. Achieving federal power 
suggests a majority of the population supported the conservative agenda. However, 
reducing the deficit translated into limiting federal spending on social programs, which 
ultimately contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives nine years later. During the mid 
1980s the EPF cash transfer became the target of continuous unilateral cuts, leading the 
provinces to argue that the federal government had seriously reneged on prior 
commitments to maintain sufficient levels of funding. Meanwhile, the provinces were 
gaining support in their argument that tax room was not part of the transfer earmarked for
 ^In 1991-92 over 30 cents of every dollar went to pay interest in the existing debt. See: Canada, 
Department of Finance, Canada’s Economic Challenge- Background (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 
January 1994), 46.
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health, meaning that federal contributions could only really include the dwindling cash 
element of the transfer.
By the time the Liberal government regained power in 1993 the momentum to 
control and reduce expenditures was dominating political agendas. Liberal promises to 
preserve funding levels and the conditions of the Canada Health Act were contradicted 
by continued fiscal cuts to social programs. In 1994 the cash component of the EPF 
transfer only covered 16.2% of hospital and medical care costs in British Columbia and 
the province was preparing for even steeper cuts under the revised transfer program, the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer.^ By the mid 1990s concerns over reduced federal 
transfers were becoming part of the public consciousness, but by the time these concerns 
translated into broad pressures for an increased federal commitment, the reductions were 
already significant and compromising the Canadian health care system. While the public 
may be familiar with “funding cuts,” it is essential to understand the complex policy 
history regarding the federal transfers for health, particularly if Canadians are expecting 
to renegotiate health care delivery in the country.
By the early 1980s health care was once again topping the list of Canadian 
popular debate. Across the nation the prevalence of user fees and extra billing was 
increasing creating a continued climate of intergovernmental political discord regarding
 ^For a discussion on the CHST, reactions from various groups and governments and potential 
ramifications see: Micheal J. Prince, “From Health and Welfare to Stealth and Farewell: Federal Social 
Policy, 1980-2000,” in Leslie A. Pal ed.. How Ottawa Spends, 1999-2000: Shape Shifting: Canadian 
Governance Toward the 2T‘ Century (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151-198.
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financing commitments/ Solutions to these issues were bogged down by the complex
fiscal arrangements outlined in the Established Programs and Financing Act. Even
former National Health Minister, Monique Begin, admitted her initial confusion in
understanding the intricacies of inter-provincial funding arrangements. In the first chapter
of her book. Medicare: Canada’s Right to Health, see recalled:
Though Minister of National Health and welfare since September 1977,1 
knew little about medicare, and with good reason. My predecessor Marc 
Lalonde, had redefined how the provinces were paid, thus changing the 
administrative relationships governing the federal role in health insurance.
[The] 1977 [EPF] agreement would become notorious, as it laid the 
foundation for the crisis in medicare. But at the time it was signed, no one 
except those most closely involved and the staff at the Department of 
Finance understood much about it. It was a closed file. The sense I got 
from people around me was that things in health were just fine.^
However, Begin soon realized that the failure of the EPF program to outline penalties for
breeching “national standards” contributed to the proliferation of direct patient charges in
the early 1980s. While user fees and extra billing varied across the country, the public
remained opposed to such departures from accepted practice. Indeed, in a 1983 Can
West Survey in each of the 10 provinces respondents rejected user fees and extra billing
by 70-80 percent.® According to Begin, “the public, media and doctors were now
engaged in a full-fledged debate that received daily radio, television, and newspaper
coverage right across the country. From the Atlantic Canada to the west coast, the issue
 ^Although accurately information was not recorded regarding user fees and extra billing it is estimated that 
hospital user fees grew from 6.6% in 1977 to 9.4% in 1981. Over the same period extra billing rose from 
4% to 4.3%. The implementation of additional charges varied throughout the provinces, but in Ontario, 
Alberta and Nova Scotia user fees were extensive enough to be “considered a problem.” Alberta set an 
alarming precedent in 1984 allowing hospitals to levy charges of up to 20$ per day or $150 per patient.
This trend was abated the same year by the institution of the Canada Health Act. See: Malcolm C. Brown, 
“Health Care Financing and the Canada Health Act,” Journal o f Canadian Studies (V olume 21, 1986), 
123-125.
 ^Monique Bégin, Medicare: Canada’s Right to Health Care (Montreal: Optimum, 1988), 17.
® Colleen YuWei, Caring For Profit (Ottawa: New Star, 1998), 77.
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slowly gained wider exposure.. The debate over service delivery served to attract and 
heighten broad public interest, shaping Canadian expectations regarding the health care 
system.
Federal concerns that the principles of the national program were in danger 
prompted the appointment of Justice Emmett Hall of the Canadian Supreme Court, in 
1979, to head a Review of Health Services, examining the rationale and justification for 
provincial user fees and extra billing. He sought to answers two questions: were total 
federal contributions declining as the provinces claimed and second, were precious health 
care dollars being siphoned into other areas? According to Hall, federal contributions 
plus tax room were actually producing more money than previous cost sharing plans, and 
thus were not responsible for fiscal pressures at the provincial level. In fact he claimed 
that when using the combined federal cash and tax transfer, in 1971 dollars, federal 
fimding for health and post secondary education actually rose 24% in the first three years 
of the EPF program.* Further, Hall claimed the provinces were not diverting dollars into 
other program areas creating a short fall in health fimding. Given his findings, he 
criticized the provinces for implementing additional charges that were not only fiscally 
unfeasible but threatened the accessibility of services for average Canadians.
A 1981 Task Force on Federal- Provincial Fiscal Arrangements supported the argument 
that user fees and extra billing direatened national standards, specifically “accessibility” 
as low income earners would be deterred from receiving health care if they could not
 ^Bégin, 17.
* Transfers were higher than anticipated because poor economic performance meant that federal tax yields 
were lower than expected. As a result, cash transfers had to be increased in compensation. See: Canada, 
Fiscal Federalism in Canada: Report o f the Parliamentary Task-Force on Federal-Provincial 
Arrangements (Ottawa: Minister of Supply, 1981), 93.
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afford additional charges. The Task Force recommended that the federal government use
its fiscal levers as a means to shape national policies.
The Task Force believes that achievement of a comprehensive, publicly 
funded hospital, medical and extended health care is a major 
accomplishment of Canadian society, one that represents the end of a long 
struggle for the realization of an ideal espoused by many Canadian 
citizens and political leaders... this achievement could be jeopardized by 
reductions in current aggregate levels of federal support, because such 
reductions would be likely to lead to increased reliance in private funding 
and ultimately to higher health care costs and erosion of the program 
principles. The Task Force concluded that there is an overriding national 
interest in the operations of health insurance plans and in the effectiveness 
of health care delivery, and that the proper role for the federal 
government is the formulation, monitoring, and enforcement o f conditions 
in its financial support ofprovincial programs?
Furthermore, in agreeing that levels of funding were “adequate”, the Task Force
recommended the establishment of clear program conditions with “provisions for some
withholding of federal financial support to provincial plans which did not meet those
conditions.”*® This notion became the foundation of the Canada Health Act policy of
tying user fees and extra billing to dollar for dollar reductions in federal health transfers.
Responding to public sentiment, the federal government introduced the Canada
Health Act on 1 April 1984, to halt any infringements to fi"ee and universal health care.**
The Act combined the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act with the Medical
Care Act, reaffirmed the national principles, and added restrictions to deter direct patient
charges, ensuring all Canadians access regardless of their ability to pay. In order to
qualify for full federal contributions the provinces were to fulfill the following criteria:
® Ibid, 114. [Author’s emphasis.] 
^Ubid, 115.
* * For discussions regarding the Canada Health Act see: Odette Madore, The Canada Health Act:
Overview and Options (Ottawa: Library of Parliament [94-4E], January 2000); or Monique Begin, 
Medicare Canada’s Right to Health (Ottawa: Optimum Publishing International, 1988).
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public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability and accessibility. 
Provisions also stipulated penalties for provinces imposing user fees and extra billing. 
Further, the provinces were required to provide annual statements on extra billing, user 
fees and the operation of their plans as they related to the criteria and conditions of the 
Act. Last, the provinces were required to give public recognition of federal transfers, for 
example through publicly released provincial budgets. The Canada Health Act served to 
create an “ideal” model of health care delivery, based on the expectations of Canadians, 
but few questioned whether public funding would remain adequate to maintain and 
develop these lofty goals.
From 1984 to 1986 various provincial governments, including British Columbia, 
faced reductions in transfers for violations of the Canada Health Act. However, the 
provinces were able to recover funds upon terminating all forms of direct charges before 
1 April 1987 in compliance with Section 20 of the Act.^  ^Clearly, the EPF transfer and 
specifically the cash portion, could be significantly diminished for provinces continuing 
to impose additional fees. The Canada Health Act exemplified the federal government’s 
ability to influence national and provincial programs through the use of its “spending 
power.” While the new rules of conditionality reasserted the national nature of the 
program, there was no attention to securing future federal financial obligations during the 
negotiations leaving the provinces committed to programs, but open to future reductions 
in EPF transfers.
British Columbia had banned extra billing on 1 April 1981, but had continued to allow user fees.
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Beyond the view of public debate, the validity of the tax component as a federal
transfer increasingly came under question. While the 1981 Task Force had claimed
levels of funding were “adequate” it was also careful to note
that a minority of the Task Force Members favoured excluding the display 
of the tax transfers in a new arrangement for support to health and post- 
secondary education. It was a fiction, it was argued, to continue to count 
their value as a federal program contribution because they were fully 
integrated into provincial tax systems several years ago. They also argued 
that the respective tax shares of the federal and provincial governments are 
now back to where they were prior to World War II.
The provinces certainly agreed with this view. In 1980 when British Columbia’s
Finance Minister was asked whether the value of the tax points was attributed to specific
programs, the Honourable H. A. Curtis replied, “Although the tax points were given in
compensation for Federal cost sharing for specific programs, under the current
arrangement there is no legal obligation to spend the funds on those programs.”*"^ A
similar sentiment was reiterated in a discussion the following year regarding the EPF.
There Curtis repeated that “According to terms of Part VI of the Federal —Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs and Financing Act, 1977, there is no
allocation among these programs of the personal and corporate income tax points
transferred to the Province in respect of established programs financing.”  ^^  In fact.
Canada, Fiscal Federalism in Canada: Report o f the Parliamentary Task-Force on Federal-Provincial 
Arrangements (Ottawa: Minister of Supply, 1981), 79.
British Columbia Legislative Assembly, Hansard (Victoria: Province of British Columbia Legislature, 
Vol. 6, No. 19,22 July 1980), 3461.
British Columbia Legislative Assembly, Hansard (Victoria: Province of British Columbia Legislature, 
Vol. 12, No. 9,24 June 1981), 6411.
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the province does not record the value of the tax points in the budget identifying “EPF 
transfers.” The figure only encompasses cash transfers as outlined in the Canada Health 
Act. Tax dollars have been included in consolidated revenue, leaving the cash element as 
the only visible portion of the transfer.
As a result of the Canada Health Act and shifting interpretations of the transfer 
the cash portion of the transfer was illuminated for the provinces, the national 
government, and the public. But there was little emphasis during the national health care 
debate regarding the consequences of potential changes to the existing EPF program. At 
the time, fear of federal decentralization of social programs was still in its infancy. In 
1981 the federal government remained committed to cover a substantial share of program 
costs, roughly 47% of provincial health expenditures when combining cash and tax 
transfers.*^ The Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, anticipating re­
negotiations in 1982, recommended maintaining block funding for the 1982- 87 period, 
but separating transfers for post-secondary education and health according to existing 
formulas of allotment (32.1 % and 67.9%) in order to “clearly and visibly” allocate 
dollars into specific program areas.*’ The Task Force further suggested the revenue 
guarantee continue as part of the EPF package. In 1981 this guarantee accounted for 
6.7% of EPF transfers, dollars provided in compensation for absorbing hospital insurance 
into the program during the 1976 negotiations. However, during renegotiations in 1982 
the federal government viewed the existence of the revenue guarantee quite differently.
In their argument they recalled the original intent of the revenue guarantee and claimed
Canada, Fiscal Federalism in Canada: Report o f the Parliamentary Task-Force on Federal-Provincial 
Arrangements (Ottawa: Minister of Supply, 1981), 93.
Ibid., 79. The division of transfers for post secondary education and health remained a recommendation 
by the federal government in the new agreement from 1982 to 1987.
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that it should be eliminated since the provinces had ample time to adjust to changes in the 
tax structure. In 1981 the federal government announced its intention to terminate the 
guarantee in April 1982 commensurate of one point personal income tax room, plus the 
equivalent amount in cash. A 1982 Ontario Budget Paper argued the reduction would 
cost the provinces $5.2 billion over a five year period.** Whether or not the revenue 
guarantee was part of the program transfer was always under considerable debate, but its 
extinguishment marked the beginning of constant reduction measures to the EPF 
program.*^
Uncertainty over fiscal transfers coincided with emerging concerns regarding
increased decentralization between the two levels of government. In line with
constitutional rhetoric. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sought to minimize concerns about
decentralizing tendencies in a news conference conducted on 12 February 1981. Jeffery
Simpson fi*om the Globe and Mail questioned whether upcoming negotiations would aim
to reduce the “excessive decentralization” occurring in the country resulting from a
declining national fiscal presence in social policy transfers.^** Trudeau responded:
You talk about or worry about excessive decentralization. I’d confess to 
you that it is a worry— ... in 1959... we were spending 52 per cent of 
total government expenditures, and the provinces and municipalities, 48 
percent. Now 20 years later ... the situation has changed dramatically.
Now it is one-third in the hands of the federal government; two-thirds,
66.8 per cent, in the hands of the provinces and municipalities. So, there 
is no doubt that in fiscal and expenditure terms, there has been a very
** Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions that Created 
the Canadian Health Insurance System, 2”** ed., (Montreal: McGill Queens, 1987), 434. Also see: Allan M. 
Maslove and Bohodar Rubashewsky “Cooperation and Confrontation: The Challenges of Fiscal 
Federalism,” in Michael Prince ed.. How Ottawa Spends 1986-1987: Tracking the Tories (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1986), 109.
Canada, Preserving Universal Medicare: A Government o f Canada Position Paper (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 1983). Here the argument was made that the Revenue Guarantee was not considered 
a reduction.
Quoted in Canadian Council on Social Development, Submission to the Parliamentary Task Force on 
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1981), 7.
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drastic decentralization in the past 20 years. And I would say quite 
frankly, I do not think that can continue. I think it should be 
arrested....We certainly don’t propose to solve this problem on the back 
of the poor and the sick, but we think that the federal and provincial 
governments together should find some ways of, shall we say, altering 
this trend—which is not marginal but, as I say, very, very vivid, very 
worrying.^*
That same year the first limits to the EPF program were legislated in order to pursue 
deficit reduction and expenditure restraint policies. Trailing only nine months after 
Trudeau’s speech, the federal Minister of Finance announced plans to trim $5.7 billion 
from federal transfers to the provinces over the following five years for social programs 
including health and post-secondary education.Deem ing federal reductions in transfers 
necessary, the federal government shifted from a policy of negotiating changes in fiscal 
transfers to announcing them, further alienating the provinces.^^
The actual announcement fell in line with the Bill C-97, renewing EPF transfers 
for another five years. Under the new agreement basic cash, which was previously 
calculated independently, was now a residual value of the tax transfer. Prior, wealthier 
provinces, such a British Columbia, with a large tax base and revenue generating 
capacities were able to keep excess revenues where the value of the tax points exceeded 
basic cash. Now basic cash was equivalent to the provincial entitlement minus the tax
Quoted in ibid.
^  These proposed reductions were to be achieved by eliminating the value of the revenue guarantee from 
transfer payments. Allan J. MacEachen was served as Federal Finance Minister from March 1980 to 
September 1982.
For discussions on changing federal priorities, specifically deficit reduction, see: Paul A. Hobson and 
France St Hilaire, Reforming Federal Provincial Relations: Towards Sustainable Federalism (Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1993); James J Rice and Michael J. Prince, “The Department of National 
Health and Welfare: The Attack on Social Policy,” in G. Bruce Doem ed.. How Ottawa Spends Your Tax 
Dollars: Federal Priorities in 1981 (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1981); Allan Muscovitch, 
“Slowing the Steamroller: The Federal Conservatives, the Social Sector and Child Benefit Reform,” in 
Katherine A Graham ed.. How Ottawa Spends 1990-1991: Tracking the Second Agenda (Ottawa: Carleton 
University Press, 1990); or James J Rice and Michael J. Prince, “Lowering the Safety Net and Weakening 
the Bonds of Nationhood: Social Policy in the Mulroney Years,” in Susan D. Phillips ed.. How Ottawa 
Spends 1993-1994: A More Democratic Canada... ? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993).
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transfer. As a result, the value of the cash portion would diminish as the value of the tax 
points grew.^ "^  Thomas Courchene argued the federal claimed that cash transfers should 
decline as tax points increase was simply “weak.” The federal government argued as the 
value of the 14.85 equalized personal income tax points [PIT] and the one corporate 
income tax [CIT] point increased in value, the provinces need less cash. But as 
Courchene notes, “since Ottawa’s 85.14 PIT points and 99 CIT points would also 
increase in value ... the federal government could afford to maintain the transfer.
Despite this argument, from 1982-87 the provinces were subjected to the revised EPF 
formula.
While the cash portion of the transfer now seemed destined to decline, it was not 
until the late 1980s that continuous reductions in the cash transfer began to threaten 
federal-provincial relations and the national policy. In a submission to the Task Force on 
Federal -Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, federal Minister of Finance Allan MacEachen 
warned that deficit reduction goals would outweigh social policy agendas stating, “ the 
most urgent priority of the federal government is to strengthen its fiscal position. 
Transfers to the provinces cannot be insulated from policies of restraint. Less than 
two years after passing the Canada Health Act, a measure to ensure adequate and
The new formula also meant the end of transitional payments and levelling adjustments.
^  Thomas J. Courchene, “The Federal Provincial Dimensions of the Budget: Two Cheers For the CHST,” 
in Thomas J. Courchene and Thomas A. Wilson eds.. The 1995 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect 
(Kingston: Institute for Policy Analysis, 1995), 117.
^  Quoted in Canada, Fiscal Federalism in Canada: Report o f the Parliamentary Task-Force on Federal- 
Provincial Arrangements (OWa.'wa:. Minister of Supply, 1981), 34.
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appropriate health care for Canadians, fiirther reductions to the EPF were announced by 
reviewing the escalator, which ensured the growth of transfers relative to inflation; 
threatening the maintenance of the very principles the Canada Health Act advocated. In 
1986 the escalator would be reduced by two percent, followed in 1989 by an additional 
percentage point.
In 1991, Bill C-69, known as the Government Restraint Act, was enacted at the 
federal level limiting per capita entitlements under the EPF at 1989-90 levels until 
1992.^’ The escalator would be further reduced to the GNP minus three percent. Federal 
efforts to restrain spending outraged provincial governments. The effects of Bill C-69 
were far reaching and compromised a variety of social programs including the Canada 
Assistance Plan [CAP], which had operated since 1967 on a fifty-fifty cost-sharing basis.
Impending cuts to federal transfers led British Columbia to turn to the B.C. Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, where the province was denied a favourable 
verdict at both levels, regarding the federal government’s obligations to maintain 
traditional levels of funding for the Canada Assistance Plan. In arguing its case, British 
Columbia has raised two constitutional questions.^* First, “Has the Government of 
Canada any statutory, prerogative or contractual authority to limit its obligation under the 
Canada Assistance Plan Act [sic], R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1 and its Agreement with the 
Government of British Columbia dated 23 March 1967, to contribute 50 per cent of the 
cost to British Columbia of assistance and welfare services?” And second, “Do the terms
Bob Porter, M.P., “The Health Care System In Canada and Its Funding: No Easy Solutions,” First 
Report o f the Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and the Status o f Women 
(Ottawa: June 1991), 16.
^  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan(BC). http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc- 
scc/en/pub/1991/vol2/html/1991scr2_0525html (1 April 2003).
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of the Agreement dated March 23,1967 between the Governments of Canada and British 
Columbia, the subsequent conduct of the Government of Canada pursuant to the 
Agreement and the provisions of the Canada Assistance Plan Act [sic], R.S.C. 1970, c. C- 
\, give rise to a legitimate expectation that the Government o f Canada would introduce 
no bill into Parliament to limit its obligation under the Agreement or the Act without the 
consent o f British Columbia?” Although the questions were in relation to CAP transfers, 
the judicial interpretations were relevant in determining federal obligations in all cost 
sharing programs. The federal government now seemed determined to announce 
intended changes rather than negotiate with the provinces, creating fiscal uncertainty and 
seriously straining federal-provincial relations.
The answer to the first question at both levels was affirmative, claiming the 
federal government had the authority to limit contributions because “the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty reflected in s. 42(1) of the federal Interpretation Act,” states 
that "Every Act shall be construed as to reserve to Parliament the power of repealing or 
amending it..." Further, “Under s. 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867, a money bill...can 
only be introduced on the initiative of the government. In these circumstances, the natural 
meaning to be given to the Agreement is that Canada's obligation is to pay the 
contributions which are authorized fi"om time to time and not the contributions that were 
authorized when the Agreement was signed. In other words the federal government 
was not legally obligated to maintain funding levels, which could be altered at their 
prerogative without warning or negotiation.
Regarding the second question, both the British Columbia Court of Appeal and
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the Canadian Supreme Court determined that British Columbia did not have a legitimate
expectation that the federal government would not limit its obligations without the
province’s consent. Specifically,
the federal government did not act illegally in invoking the power of 
Parliament to amend the Plan without obtaining the consent of British 
Columbia. The doctrine of legitimate expectations does not create 
substantive rights — in this case, a substantive right to veto proposed 
federal legislation. The doctrine is part of the rules of procedural fairness 
which can govern administrative bodies.
Where it is applicable, it can only create a right to make representations 
or to be consulted. Moreover, the doctrine does not apply to the 
legislative process. The government, which is an integral part of this 
process, is thus not constrained by the doctrine from introducing a bill to 
Parliament. A restraint on the executive in the introduction o f legislation 
would place a fetter on the sovereignty o f Parliament itself This is 
particularly true when the restraint relates to the introduction of a money 
bill. It is also fundamental to our system o f government that a 
government is not bound by the undertakings o f its predecessor. The 
doctrine would derogate from this essential feature of democracy.^®
Furthermore,
Bill C-69 was not an indirect, colourable attempt to regulate in provincial 
areas of jurisdiction. It is simply an austerity measure. Further, the simple 
withholding of federal money, which had previously been granted to fund a 
matter within provincial jurisdiction, does not amount to the regulation of 
that matter. The new legislation simply limits the growth of federal 
contributions. While the Government Expenditures Restraint Act impacts 
upon a constitutional interest outside the jurisdiction of Parliament, such 
impact is not enough to find that a statute encroaches upon the jurisdiction 
of the other level of government. The Court should not, under the 
‘overriding principle of federalism,’ supervise the federal government's 
exercise of its spending power in order to protect the autonomy of the 
provinces.^^
Essentially, the provinces became completely vulnerable to reductions in federal 
programs, even though those same programs were deemed national in scope.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Upon receiving royal assent for Bill C- 69, the federal government announced the 
freeze on EPF transfers would be extended to 1994-95, with an anticipated saving of 
$2.34 billion over five years.^^ The escalator percentage had fallen from 5.6 in 1986 to 
zero in 1991 where it remained until 1995.^  ^ In an effort to relay concerns to the public 
and those employed in the health sector a growing number of organizations were 
cautioning about reductions in federal transfers. The Health Action Lobby, a coalition of 
national health and consumer associations, claimed in 1995 that reductions in the 
escalator resulted in a $30 billion dollar shortfall in respect to health and related 
transfers.Sim ilarly the National Forum on Health began to warn that declining 
transfers were falling to dangerously low rates, even when including the value of the tax 
transfer:
Provincial expenditures have accounted for the lion’s share of health care 
spending in Canada.... The federal share of health care spending, while 
already less than fifty percent, declined from forty-one percent to 32 
percent, from 1977 to 1995. And as the tax points grew, the federal cash 
transfers declined from 25% to 16% of total provincial health care 
expenditures.... Federal transfers for health care fell from 11% of total 
federal expenditures to around 8%.^^
Fearing the provinces might forego cash entitlements and breech the Canada Health Act
as cash transfers plummeted, the federal government linked financial penalties associated
with the Act to other transfers under Bill C-69. Parliamentary researcher Dennis
HEAL, A Prescription For Medicare (Ottawa: HEAL, 1995), 3.
For a general information on reductions to the escalator see: Jean-Denis Frechette, Federal Transfer 
Payments to the Provinces for Health and Post-Secondary Education: New Trends (Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament [93-IE], August 1995); or Alistair Thomson, Federal Support For Health Care: A Background 
Paper (Ottawa: HEAL, June 1991).
^  Canadian Health Care Association, Funding Canada’s Health Care System (Ottawa: CHCA, 1999), 1.
Ibid., 36. Similar figures are presented in Paul Boothe and Barbara Johnston, Stealing the Emperor’s 
Clothes: Deficit Offloading and National Standards in Health Care (Montreal: C.D. Howe Institute, March 
1993), 4.
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Frechette argued, “this virtually non-stop series of cuts and freezes in federal government 
transfers to the provinces pushed the federal government into a comer; it realized it 
risked control over national standards in health care, should transfers to any province 
cease entirely.” ®^ Maintaining national standards, deficit reduction goals, and some level 
of public contentment appeared to be an increasingly complex juggling act.
Using British Columbia budget publications, the trend indicated by the National 
Health Forum with regard to health related cash transfers proves to be accurate. In Table 
“A” the total EPF cash transfer received each year has been divided according to the 
federal formula to provided the allocation of the health transfer as a percentage of the 
EPF. The per capita figures, in column five, are particularly revealing of the marginal 
growth in the transfer. During the period from 1980 to 1988, growth in transfers at the 
per capita level failed to be proportionate to rate of inflation, let alone the growth of 
provincial expenditures. And for the most part, after 1987 per capita transfers began to 
decline corresponding with provincial accusations that federal funding for health care had 
been seriously eroded.
Column seven details federal cash transfers as a percentage of provincial hospital 
and medical insurance spending, the two components the federal government intended to 
fund under the original cost sharing arrangements. From 1979 to 1994 cash transfers 
have fallen from 36.3 to 16.2 percent of program spending; a relative reduction of 44 
percent. These figures would be even lower if EPF cash was calculated as a percentage 
of total provincial spending; a calculation that would be considered legitimate since block 
funds are not assigned to specific health programs.
^®Frechette.
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Table I Federal Established Programs and Financing Act Contributions to the
Province o f  British Columbia
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR EPF cash 
transfer
Received by the 
Provincial
.37government 
(In dollars)
Changes to EPF 
cash dollars 
transferred in 
1994 budget
Cash dollars 
designated to 
health as 
67.9 % of the 
transfer
(In dollars)
Population 
of British 
Columbia^*
Funding per 
capita of 
EFP cash 
dollars 
designated to 
health
Provincial 
spending on 
hospital 
insurance and 
medicare
EPF health 
funding as a 
percent of 
hospital and 
medical care 
spending by 
the province
1977 394,567,651 267,911,435 2,595,870 103.21
1978 383,185,645 260,183,053 2,641,202 98.05
1979 494,180,716 335,548,706 2,706,445 123.98 923,348,903 36.3%
1980 593,409,000^^ 402,924,711 2,789,552 144.44 1,111,200,000 36.3%
1981 638,388,000 433,465,452 2,854,237 151.86 1,433,600,000 30.2%
1982 643,861,000 437,181,619 2,888,208 151.36 1,627,000,000 26.9%
1983 652,360,000 442,952,440 2,925,731 151.40 1,905,000,000 23.1%
1984 928,536,000 630,475,944 2,960,894 212.93 2,177,000,000 29.0%
1985 1,059,490,000 719,393,710 2,988,677 240.71 2,603,400,000 27.6%
1986 1,091,252,000 740,960,108 3,023,311 245.08 2,711,700,000 27.3%
1987 1,205,263,000 818,373,577 3,082,928 265.45 2,970,200,000 27.6%
1988 1,215,270,017 825,168,330 3,158,832 261.23 3,153,700,000 26.2%
1989 1,230,181,638 835,293,578 3,248,896 257.10 3,434,200,000 24.3%
1990 1,239,750,000 1,212,600,00^^ 841,790,250 3,338,460 252.15 3,826,600,000 22.0%
1991 1,110,300,000 1,198,700,000 753,893,700 3,424,109 220.17 4,241,900,000 17.8%
1992 1,156,000,000 1,250,900,000 784,942,000 3,525,529 222.64 4,755,800,000 16.5%
1993 1,442,600,000 979,525,400 3,628,866 269.92 4,989,000,000 19.6%
1994 1,248,100,000 847,459,900 3,737,570 226.74 5,241,500,000 16.2%
Values are from various provincial budgets in Province of British Columbia, Public Accounts (Victoria; 
Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, 1974-1988); and Province of British Columbia, British 
Columbia Economic and Statistical Review (Victoria: Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, 1989- 
2001).
^  Province of British Columbia, B.C. Economic and Statistical Review (Victoria: Ministry of Finance and 
Corporate Relations, 2001), 169.
Unaudited value.
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Even when examining total spending on health by both levels of government, it is clear 
that increasing provincial fiscal responsibility for health care has been the dominant 
trend. William Robson’s study, which examined total health expenditures charted a 
similar development.'*^
Health (Financial Management System Basis)
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Figure A
Indeed, according to Robson’s figures, the percentage of federal health expenditures, 
reveal federal contributions to be a larger percentage of total health expenditures. This is 
because “total health expenditures” include revenues allocated by the federal government 
to health, such as health services for aboriginal people, the population of the Yukon,
Note all calculations will use values as stated in the original budget for each year, rather than numbers 
revised in 1994.
William P. Robson, “Federal Spending in Four Dimensions,” in Thomas J. Courchene and Thomas A. 
Wilson eds., The 1995 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect (Kingston: Institute for Policy Analysis,
1995), 67-68.
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immigrants, veterans, inmates in federal penitentiaries and members of the Canadian 
Armed Forces. Federal health expenditures also encompass programs related to 
researching food and drug safety, medical devices and infectious diseases as well as 
monitoring environmental hazards and of course transfers to the provinces for health 
care. Even with all these areas combined federal spending in health remains 
disproportionately low relative to provincial commitments.
While one may legitimately argue that federal transfers to the provinces have 
been declining, there are serious concerns as to how these dollars are recorded and 
presented to the public at the provincial level. The Established Programs and Financing 
(EPF) Act involves a series of complex formulas which serve to deter public inquiry and 
scrutiny at the most basic level. Failure to define the transfers or detail subsequent 
changes without sufficient explanation, as well as providing incorrect summaries evident 
in provincial accounts has complicated matters even fiirther. For example, while the 
opening chapters of the British Columbia provincial budget outline the components of the 
Established Programs and Financing Act as “a cash and tax transfer combined with a per 
capita extended health care grant,” when recording “revenues received” they fail to 
clarify that the “EPF Contributions fi-om the Federal Government” only encompass the 
cash transfer. Failing to make this distinction in the public accounts makes it difficult for 
the average person to comprehend these fiscal arrangements. Even those aware that only 
the cash value is recorded are still left to assume that the extended health care grants are 
included under “Other Payments” and the tax transfer is calculated as part of “Taxation 
Revenue” since there is no explanation where these components of the transfer are 
recorded.
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Further, in 1994 changes were documented for EPF revenues received from 1989 
to 1993, but alterations in the report were only given for 1990 tol992^^ To record 
changes to revenues received and spent over the course of five years makes it virtually 
impossible to track and account for EPF cash dollars. The explanatory note for the 
retroactive revisions stated that “For comparative purposes, revenue has been reinstated 
in 1989/90 and onwards to reflect an accounting change to record personal income tax on 
an accrual basis. This change also affects Established Programs Financing (EPF) 
revenue as the amount of the EPF entitlement is determined by deducting a tax transfer of 
13.5 points of personal income tax and one point of corporate income tax. For example, 
in 1992/93, the effect of the accounting change increases revenue by $105.3 million -  
personal income tax increases by $194.2 million and revenue from Established Programs 
Financing decreases by $88.9 million.'^^ These “decreases” would be reflected in the 
cash portion of the transfer as a residual of the tax component. In the original 1992/93 
budget the cash transfer totalled $1,156,000,000, changes recorded in 1994 claimed the 
cash transfer received was actually $1,250,900,000- an increase of $94.9 million.
Because final figures have been provided, determining the difference in values should 
simply be a calculation of addition or subtraction, but clearly that is not the case.
Further, there have been instances where figures have been used incorrectly. In an 
effort to exhibit the decline in federal transfers the following table was posted in the 1994
Province of British Columbia, British Columbia Economic and Statistical Review (Victoria: Ministry of 
Finance and Corporate Relations, 1994).
Ibid., 235. [Author’s emphasis.]
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budget as a “Summary of Federal Established Programs Financing ... Contributions to
British Columbia.”^
Table II
1977/78 1983/84 1993/94
EPF Entitlement ($millions)
Tax...............................................................  318.5 606.8 1,345.3
Cash........................................... .................  309.7 928.5 1,248.1
Total...........................................................  628.2 1,535.3 2,593.4
EPF as a percentage of British Columbia spending in health and post-secondary 
education
Cash...........................................................  21.7% 25.0% 15.8%
Total.........................................................  47.2% 41.3% 32.9%
The summary exhibits the same general trend in cash transfers, and corresponds with 
Robson’s argument that federal transfers are declining even when including the value of 
the tax transfer. But these calculations raise some serious concerns in that incorrect 
values have been used. The cash values of the “EPF entitlement” for 1983/84 and 
1993/94 are actually figures from budgets produced in 1984/85 and 1994/95. The cash 
transfer for 1983 should read $652.1 million and the value for 1993 should be $1,442.6 
million.'*  ^ Further, the cash transfer cited for 1977 fails to correspond with any 
entitlements recorded during that period. Provincial budgets are public documents 
designed to ensure government accountability and inform the public how and where their 
tax dollars are spent. However, the intricate nature of the EPF means even public 
documents are presented in an unclear and complex fashion serving to both undermine 
public interest and delegitimize provincial accountability. This is all the more alarming 
in that these same documents were intended to better educate the public as to the
Ibid., 114.
These values are from provincial accounts for the corresponding years.
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province’s financial spending commitments. Complexities in the provincial budget 
parallel the historical misunderstanding of the EPF program, which in both instances, was 
seemingly designed and destined to actually discourage public understanding and 
awareness.
While the intricacies of federal transfers remained blurred for much of the public, 
by the mid 1990s the dwindling nature of these funds was certainly attracting increased 
public attention. In 1995 the Established Program and Financing Act was replaced with 
the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) which merged federal transfers for 
health, education and the previous Canada Assistance Plan into one unallocated block 
fund. While there were few structural changes to health and education transfers under 
the new arrangement, failure to target monies meant these three programs would now be 
competing for dollars. Furthermore, these funds would be subject to even further cuts. 
Initiated in the 1995 budget the CHST outlined cutbacks in the base allocations 
equivalent to $2.5 billion in 1996-97 and $4.5 billion the following fiscal year."^  ^
Predictions regarding growth or reduction to transfers after 1997 were not actually 
acknowledged in the budget papers. However, the Government of British Columbia 
predicted drastic reductions in contributions to all three programs now included in the 
block fimd. “The CHST will considerably reduce provincial social transfer revenue. In 
1996/97 British Columbia’s cash transfer will be $477 million less than what it received 
in 1994/95. The 1997/98 entitlement will be $824 million less -  a reduction of 37% from
Allan Muscovitch, “ Canada Health and Social Transfer,” in Raymond B. Blake, Penny E Bryden, and 
Frank Strain eds., 77ie Welfare State in Canada Past Present and Future (Mount Allison: Irwin, 1997), 
110.
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the 1994/1995 amount.” ’^ Transfers under the CHST would also continue to be
calculated as residual to the existing tax point components outline in previous EPF
agreements, serving to further reduce cash transfers."** Fearful of this trend author Robin
Broadway argued that,
the decision to fold the CHST with the EFP program and allow the 
resulting transfer to be comprised partly of a tax-point transfer dating back 
to 1977completely defies reason... allowing the CHST cash transfer to be 
determined as a residual after subtracting the tax-transfer component, 
when combined with the cuts announced for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998, 
will guarantee that the cash component for the EPF and CAP combined 
will automatically fall to zero some time early in the twenty-first 
century.... Either a failure of the CHST to resume this growth path or 
future cutbacks in the CHST allocation as a result of the continuing budget 
restraint that is almost certain to come will simply accelerate the time at 
which the cash runs out."*^
Eliminating cash transfers would severely compromise federal spending power and the
ability to enforce criteria of the Canada Health Act. But even more importantly, the
federal government would surrender its ability to shape necessary health care reform at
the national level. Aware that declining federal transfers may entice some provinces to
risk forgoing penalties associated with the Canada Health Act, the CHST incorporated
Bill C-20 allowing any cash transfer to be used to ensure compliance with the Canada
Health Act.
Echoing a similar concern, advocacy groups such as the National Council of 
Welfare, were also warning that EPF payments to some provinces would become non-
Province of British Columbia, British Columbia Economic and Statistical Review (Victoria: Ministry of 
Finance and Corporate Relations, 1995), 116.
Tax points included in the CHST transfer are equivalent to the 14.8 personal and one corporate tax point 
previously included in the Established Programs and Financing Act.
® Robin Broadway, “The Implications of the Fiscal Budget For Fiscal Federalism,” in Thomas J. 
Courchene and Thomas A Wilson eds.. The 1995 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect (Toronto: 
Institute for Policy Analysis, 1995), 100.
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existent by the year 2000.^ *^  However, this was not the case owing to two distinct but 
related issues. First, as Canada’s most revered social program, termination of federal 
influence in the national health program would create political turmoil for any governing 
party. A 1995 public survey by Ottawa based Ekos Research Associates claimed that 
nearly 80% of those polled wanted the federal government to either maintain or increase 
its role in the health care sector. Eighty-nine percent of those polled said the provinces 
and Ottawa should work together to improve the health-care system.^* Second, fiscal 
payments may be partially safeguarded through constitutional commitments as embodied 
in Section 36 of the Constitution Act of 1982.^  ^ The Act states that both the federal and 
provincial levels of government are jointly committed to the “national equity agenda, 
including providing equal opportunities, reducing disparities and providing essential 
public services to all Canadians.”^^  In fact, then Justice Minister Jean Chrétien claimed 
the Constitution would foster strong public service programs. “Sharing the wealth,” he 
declared “has become a fimdamental right of Canadians and that is why the resolution ... 
commits both orders of government to promoting equal opportunities for the well-being 
of Canadians; furthering economic development to reduce disparities in opportunities and 
specifically providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. By 
entrenching this principle in the constitution we are enshrining the obligation of sharing
National Council of Welfare, Funding Health and Higher Education: Danger Looming (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply Services, 1991), 20.
Colleen Fuller, Caring For Profit (Ottawa: New Star Books, 1998), 77.
For further discussion see: Paul A. Hobson and France St Hilaire, Reforming Federal Provincial 
Relations: Towards Sustainable Federalism (Toronto: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1993); Paul 
A. Hobson and Robin W. Broadway, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada (Toronto: Canadian 
Tax Foundation Tax Paper No.96, 1993); or Aymen Nayder and Marina Morrow, “Section 36 of the 
Constitution: Canada’s Commitment to Social Services,” in Raymond B. Blake, Penny E Bryden, and 
Frank Strain eds.. The Welfare State in Canada Past Present and Future (Mount Allison: Irwin, 1997).
Broadway, 103.
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which has been fundamental to the Canadian experience.” '^^  Referring to Section 36 of
the Constitution author Aymen Nader claimed that
if the Constitution Act is to be taken seriously it also incumbent on 
them to legislatively ensure that these programs are of a “reasonable 
quality.” What is clear from the wording of this section is that its 
provisions are directed at all Canadians. Furthermore, only the federal 
government is in a position that the commitments.. .outlined are met.
While it cannot act alone, in that the participation of the provinces is 
essential to meeting the requirements..., the federal government is the 
level of government which bears ultimate responsibility for all 
Canadians. Only the federal government, acting with the provinces, 
can meet that part of the commitment that essential public services will 
be provided to “all Canadians.”^^
Constitutional obligations to uphold national programs essentially limited the federal
option to terminate cash transfers or adopt straight tax transfers. According to Broadway,
a commitment to “spending power is what reconciles the joint federal-provincial
responsibility for achieving equity through the provision of public services in areas of
provincial responsibility.”^^  If the federal government were to test its constitutional
obligations, the provinces would then be open to pursue health care reforms with little or
no commitment to maintain the standards of the Canada Health Act and only public
sentiment would be left to shape health care policy.
Persistent renegotiations and direct modifications to fiscal policy has resulted in a
redefined federal commitment to the national health care program. Implementation of
block funding, a seemingly rational policy adjustment at the time, allowed the federal
government to gradually redefine funding obligations. What began as fifty-fifty cost
Quoted in Nayder, 39.
Ibid., 37.
Ibid. Thomas J. Courchene provides an opposing argument to Broadway in “Federal Provincial 
Dimensions of the Budget: Two Cheers for the CHST,” in The Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect, 
107. For a discussion on spending power and equity dimensions see: Paul A. Hobson and France St 
Hilaire, Reforming Federal Provincial Relations: Towards Sustainable Federalism (Toronto: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1993).
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sharing has fizzled into a limited cash payment complicated by tax components and 
competing program interests within the block fimd structure. A federal desire to meet 
emerging economic goals, specifically debt reduction, has meant re-evaluating social 
policy funding mechanisms. Through this ongoing historical process the national 
government has also found itself in a position to shape the future of health care in 
Canada. Given federal commitments to reduce expenditures over the last two decades, it 
is highly unlikely that this trend will be reversed. As a consequence, the national 
government institutes pressures to encourage the provinces and the public to examine 
reform options in order to balance funding reductions with service delivery.
By the end of the twentieth century Canadians were becoming increasingly aware 
of declining federal transfers which were facilitating variation in provincial health policy. 
According to parliamentary researcher Jack Stillborn, “restraints on federal transfers 
have...coincided with growing provincial experimentation with alternative delivery 
mechanisms, notably in the health care field.”^^  Fiscal constraints perpetuated the sense 
of “crisis” as pressures for privatization increase and citizens wimess cuts and 
shortages at the local level. When in 2002 an Environics poll asked “Is there a crisis in 
health care?”—two-thirds of Canadians agreed.^* Whether this perception is fully 
justified is another debate, but it is clear Canadians are drawing a connection between 
funding and ensuing crisis. In the same year, an Ipsos Reid survey found that eight out of 
ten Canadians agreed long term sustainable funding is needed to improve the health care
Jack Stillborn, Federal -  Provincial Fiscal Relations (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch [93-lOE], 
1998).
^  Cited in Maioni.
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system. The questioned remains are governments going to respond to public 
dissatisfaction? Even author Thomas Courchene, who supported the CHST because it 
allows greater flexibility in social assistance programming for the provinces, has 
admitted that “given the series of arbitrary federal cuts, freezes and caps to transfers over 
the last decade, the time has come to provide some certainty in terms of cash transfers.” ®^ 
In the 1980s Canadians were drawn into the health care debate to deal with the 
visible and pressing issue of service delivery. Meanwhile, beneath the surface, fiscal 
pressures were forcing governments to employ restraint measures, leading federal 
transfers, specifically the EPF, to significantly diminish in the following decade. In the 
process, the working relationship between the two levels of government soured as the 
national program became distinctly provincial in nature. Provincial governments, in 
accordance with their jurisdictional authority, essentially controlled the service and 
delivery of health care shaped by the broad parameters of the Canada Health Act. But 
increasingly the provinces were also footing most of the bill, calling into question the 
maintenance of national standards. For the most part the public seems determined to 
appeal to governments at every level to uphold these standards. As a result, frustrated 
provincial governments have turned to the public to help reinstate federal funding. While 
the public clearly understands provincial accusations of “under-funding,” they may be ill 
equipped to comprehend the complex nature of federal-provincial funding arrangements, 
merged in a confluence of historical policies, funding arrangements and jurisdictional
Ipsos Ried, Poll -  Second Annual Report Card on Health Care in Canada (Ipsos Ried, 19 August 2002), 
www.angusreid.com/pdC'media/nu920819-1Eng.pdf
“  Thomas J Courchene, “The Federal Provincial Dimensions of the Budget: Two Cheers for the CHST, ” 
in Thomas J. Courchene and Thomas A Wilson eds. The 1995 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect 
(Toronto: Institute for Policy Analysis, 1995), 115.
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issues. This thesis exhibits how a series of seemingly minor policy adjustments 
compound to have broad ramifications overtime. Lacking a thorough understanding of 
the complexity of this historical relationship in turn cultivated public confusion as to why 
the two levels of government are unable to resolve the “crisis” in health care.
92
Conclusion;
“Building on Canadian Values.”
A Precarious Future
Through a series of negotiations, coercive directives from Ottawa, and 
reinterpretation of the British North America Act, a fiscal inequity between the two levels 
of government has emerged in regard to financing Canada’s national health care 
program. Gradually the provinces acquired increasing responsibility to fimd what many 
Canadians describe as our most valued and, admittedly, most expensive social program. 
Imbalanced fiscal relations have stemmed from a series of renegotiated transfer 
agreements beginning in 1977, as prior cost sharing arrangements gave way to block 
funding outlined in the Established Programs and Financing Act (EPF). The EPF 
provided a combined cash and tax transfer to the provinces to fimd three existing 
programs, hospital insurance. Medicare and education. While the new block fund 
structure allowed the provinces the desired flexibility to determine service delivery and 
health care priorities, the new agreement relieved the federal government of conditional 
cash transfers and failed to ensure a long-term, legislated federal commitment, 
consequently opening the door for renegotiating intergovernmental transfers.
Specifically, modifications during the 1980s, which sought to bring transfers in line with 
new federal deficit reduction and cost efficiency goals, meant the provinces would 
acquire greater responsibility to finance health care delivery. As a result, through a series 
of negotiations the cash portion became destined to decline as value of the tax transfer 
grew, leaving fewer federal dollars designated to these specific programs and leading the
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provinces to question their obligation to maintain the principles of the Canada Health 
Act. The provinces’ concerns were Anther exacerbated during the late 1980s and 1990s 
as a series of unilateral adjustments to the escalator, by the federal government, 
significantly reduced the value of the cash transfer. ' By the late twentieth century, 
funding issues combined with public outcry regarding waitlists, delisting services and 
fears over privatization, lead some to suggest that the Canadian Health Care system was 
in dire need of reform. However, restructuring Medicare can only be accomplished by 
evaluating and seeking solutions to the funding tug of war that has continued to plague 
the program. Consequently, it is important to understand the evolution of fiscal transfers 
over the last three decades in order for Canadians to determine the type of program that 
should be delivered and the fiscal commitments of the various levels of government.
Canadians have become so disheartened with the health care system that a 1999 
Angus Reid survey claimed that 76 percent of those polled believed the health care 
system was in crisis and in serious need of reform.^ Even more telling only 52 percent of 
Canadians believed the Canada Health Act [CHA] lived up to its principles; meaning 
almost half of the public felt that federal legislation designed to oversee Medicare has 
proven inadequate at ensuring the basic standards of the program and adapting to
' For an excellent overview of shifting federal political attitudes regarding social policies and funding see: 
Micheal J. Prince, “From Health and Welfare to Stealth and Farewell: Federal Social Policy, 1980-2000,” 
in Leslie A. Pal ed.. How Ottawa Spends, 1999-2000: Shape Shifting: Canadian Governance Toward the 
2T ‘^ Century (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151-198.
‘ Angus Reid Group, Poll (Ontario: Angus Reid Group, 11 May1999) at www.angusreid.com/pdftmedia/pr 
9905 /.PDF (accessed 13 June 2003).
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emerging health needs.^ Given growing public concern regarding health care 
William Robson, in a discussion on jurisdictional authority in 1995 correctly pointed out 
that “it is the provincial governments who are overwhelmingly responsible for the merits 
and defects of the health care system Canadians now enjoy,” and believed “it is to the 
provinces that Canadians should logically turn.. with their complaints and demands for 
reform.”* However, if the provinces are unable to maintain services at appropriate levels 
owing to disproportionate funding arrangements for a program intended to be national in 
scope, should not Canadians be turning to the level of government enabling the program 
and enforcing the standards? Federal neglect to maintain stable and sufficient funding 
has severely jeopardized the state of health care in Canada. Through a series of unilateral 
directives by the late 1990s federal fimding for health care had declined to less than 27 
percent when combining cash and tax transfers and less than 15 percent when only 
including federal cash contributions. Increasingly the fiscal burden has rested with the 
provinces, compromising service delivery and ultimately stirring demands for private 
health care options.^ This is not to say that the provinces are innocent of mismanaging the 
health care system, but that the persistent battle over funding has hindered the most 
important aspect of health care -  program delivery. In theory, if the value of the cash 
transfers continues to decline, some provinces may be inclined to forego federal transfers.
 ^Ibid. These polls can be deceptive in that it is unclear how many Canadians really know the principles of 
the Canada Health Act.
William P. Robson “Federal Spending in Four Dimensions,” in Thomas J. Courchene and Thomas A. 
Wilson eds., The 1995 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect (Kingston: Institute for Policy Analysis, 
1995X68.
^For an early discussion on privatization options see. Health and Welfare Canada, Privatization in the 
Canadian Health Care System: Assertions, Evidence, Ideology and Options (Canada: Minister of Supply 
and Services, 1985).
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allowing them to operate systems in violation of the Canada Health Act.^ Thus, sufficient
levels of funding are vital in protecting and promoting the national nature of the program.
Six years after Robson voiced his concerns the provinces sought to realign public
dissatisfaction regarding the health care system with their own demands for an increased
federal financial commitment by embarking on an aggressive national media campaign.
In the 2001 advertisement the provinces claimed that federal contributions had declined
to fourteen percent of provincial health expenditures. Essentially the provinces sought to
encourage Canadians to pressure the federal government to reinvest in the national
program. In response to provincial fhistrations and growing dissatisfaction with the
system, Prime Minister Jean Chretien appointed a Royal Commission in the same year to
investigate the Future of Health Care in Canada. The study, headed by former
Saskatchewan premier Roy Romanow, sought to engage Canadians in a national dialogue
in order to “preserve the long term stability of Canada’s universally accessible, publicly
funded health care system.”  ^ Without investigation, recommendation and reform, some
argued, the national program could be nearing extinction. Reaching a similar historically
informed conclusion as this thesis the Commission recognized that
sometimes by design, sometimes by financial necessity, and more often 
by default, the provinces are increasingly willing to go it alone in so far 
as their respective health care systems are concerned. Today, we sit on 
the cusp. Left unchecked, this system will inevitably produce thirteen 
clearly separate health care systems, each with differing methods of 
payment, delivery, and outcomes, coupled by an ever increasingly volatile 
and debilitating debate surrounding our nation, its values and principles.^
® Forgoing federal transfers, while a threat occasionally uttered by the provinces, continues to be a limited 
option for most provinces since the federal government has tied penalties under the Canada Health Act to a 
number of provincial transfers.
Canada, Report prepared by Roy Romanow, Building on the Values: The Future o f Health Care in 
Canada (Ottawa, 2002), www.hcrsc.gc.ca/english/pdiyromanow/pdfs/HCC Final_Report.pdf (accessed 
03/09/01), 1.
 ^ xvn.
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Romanow’s sense of his mandate carried the responsibility that the 
Commission’s final recommendations would “faithfully reflect the values Canadians 
want expressed in the policies and programs that define their health care system.”  ^While 
determining the “values” of Canadians would be subjective at best, as the study could 
only represent those who expressed opinions, the findings were consistent with polls 
conducted throughout the country, in terms of support for the system and reform 
priorities. In fact an Ekos poll released on 5 December 2002 claimed 57% of Canadians 
thought the Romanow report did a good job of reflecting the core values of Canadians. 
This figure rose to 74% when only those clearly aware of the final report were 
considered.
Echoing the views of Mr. Justice Emmett Hall, instigator of the Canada Health
Act over two decades earlier, the Commission argued that “Medicare has become one of
the defining features of Canada’s national identity.”** In their view,
Canadians consider equal and timely access to medically necessary health 
care services on the basis of need as a right of citizenship, not a privilege 
of status or wealth. Building on these values, Canadians have come to 
view their health care system as a national program, delivered locally but 
structured on inter-govemmental collaboration and a mutual understanding 
of values. They want and expect their governments to work together to 
ensure that the policies and programs that define Medicare remain true to 
these values.*^
While the system continues to exhibit fundamental flaws, the reality is that “Canadians 
embrace Medicare as a public good, a national symbol and a defining aspect of their
^/W,XV.
CBC News. “Health Care Polls.” www.cbc.ca/stories/2oo2/12/05/poll health02/205 (03/07/11).
' ' Canada, Report prepared by Roy Romanow, Building on the Values: The Future o f Health Care in 
Canada (Ottawa, 2002), www.hcrsc.gc.ca/english/pd&romanow/pdfs/HCC Final Report.pdf (accessed 
03/09/01), XXI.
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citizenship.”'^ Therefore, reforms aimed at preserving Canada’s universal health care 
system would be welcomed as both justified and necessary.
Heading the list of the Commission’s concerns were improving cooperation 
between the two levels of government; revamping the publicly funded health system 
guided by a new Canadian Health Covenant; updating the CHA to reflect new priorities; 
address rural, remote and aboriginal health issues; address diagnostic equipment 
shortages and improve labour relations. But, the core concern was renegotiating federal 
funding commitments as the vital component in fostering reform, stability and the 
sustainability of Canada’s national Medicare program. In the Commission’s view the 
federal government contributed “less than it previously did, and less than it should.” '"' To 
rectify under-funding and stabilize intergovernmental relations, the commission 
recommended that “adequate, stable and predictable funding arrangements” be 
established, particularly at the federal level where the government “should reinforce its 
financial commitment to health care, by replacing the current transfer system with a cash- 
only transfer, and build in mechanisms for adjusting the transfer on a ongoing basis.” 
Specifically, the report proposed several adjustments to the current transfer system under 
the Canada Health and Social Transfer [CHST] in order to restore adequate funding.
First, it suggested separating the CHST into a health and a social services transfer to 
promote “accountability and transparency” by allowing health care spending to be 
tracked, reminiscent of the original conditional grant system. Further the new “Canadian 
Health Transfer,” provided in cash, should be raised to cover 25% of health
A M  XVIII, 
'''AM  65. 
'^AM48.
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care spending as outlined in the original EPF arrangement in 1977, when 50/50 cost 
sharing was replaced with a combined cash and tax transfer. Consistent with these 
arguments, the Commission noted that cash transfers had dropped to a low of 14.6% in 
2001/2002, and federal cash and tax transfer combined were as low as 27.5% — falling 
well short of the original 50% cost sharing arrangement at the inception of the program.*® 
Citing an estimate for 2005/2006 the new cash transfer would require $4.4 billion in 
investment to stabilize the transfer at 25%.*  ^ They further recommended renewing the 
escalator to ensure growth consistent with inflation. Specifically, to guarantee constant 
and predictable growth the escalator should be set for five-year periods. Overall, the 
Commission argued that a long-term federal reinvestment is necessary to maintaining a 
national program.
In addition to reviving the cash transfer, the study noted certain areas requiring
the immediate injection of targeted federal funds to address health care priorities.
Specifically funds should be dedicated to improving rural and remote access, diagnostic
services, primary health care, home care and catastrophic drug costs.** These programs
would require an additional $8.5 million in fiinds beginning in 2003, supplemented by a
further $6.5 million in investment by 2005/2006. *^  The Commission argued.
This additional fimding by the federal government is not only consistent 
with the original Medicare commitment, it is essential to protect, promote, 
and enhance the national dimensions of public health care in Canada... 
such a reinvestment would be a prerequisite to the federal government 
resuming a leadership role within the Provinces in shaping the future o f 
Medicare
Ibid, 66.16
'^A,W.69. 
'^/W.71-72.
'^/W,7I.
20 Ibid, 70. [Author’s emphasis.]
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While Romanow correctly asserted that the federal government had both a fiscal and 
policy obligation to provide leadership through national policies such as the Canada 
Health Act, he failed to adequately address how to resolve the persistent conflict 
regarding jurisdictional authority; aside from suggesting that intergovernmental relations 
simply need to be more amicable and productive and that increased fimding levels need 
to coincide with greater provincial accountability. The provinces, content to complain 
that their systems are inadequately fimded, fail to realize that tracking health care dollars 
means not only being accountable to the federal government but also to the public. A 
public that has indicated its support for a national program, but to date have been denied 
cogent information regarding the source of health care fimding and how these dollars are 
spent. The Commission even acknowledged that the fiscal arrangements remain 
“extremely obscure to even the most informed,” and as a result it is imperative to 
improve accountability.^* “Health care in this country is now a $100 billion dollar 
enterprise, one of our society’s largest expenditures. Yet no level of government has 
done a very good Job of accounting how that money is spent. Canadians still do not 
know who to believe in the debate over which level of government is paying what share 
for health services.”^^  In concluding the discussion on funding, the Commission warned 
that the failure to reach a formal agreement on these issues would mean that 
intergovernmental wrangling over funding obligations will continue into the future and 
ultimately necessary health care reforms will continue to be overshadowed by these 
debates. While the Commission outlined numerous recommendations for promoting 
sustainable health care, progressive reform continues to be framed by the status of
47.
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intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Receiving exceptional fanfare, debate, and media coverage at the release of the 
Commission’s report, “The Future of Health Care in Canada,” newspapers declared that 
“few [Canadian’s] criticized the principles expressed in the s t u d y . U p o n  such wide 
spread popular approval Prime Minister Jean Chretien claimed he could make “one 
promise... the Romanow report will not gather dust on a self. We will move quickly. 
Chretien even anticipated legislation arising from the study by spring of 2003.
Accordingly, the showdown began in early 2003 as the two levels of government 
negotiated a new funding arrangement for health. In the end a $34.8 billion dollar deal, 
over five years, was signed between the provinces and Ottawa.Consistent with the 
Commission’s recommendations the agreement included $16 billion towards a five year 
health care reform fund for primary care, home care and catastrophic drug charges; $13.5 
billion in new funding over five years and $2.6 billion for diagnostic equipment, 
computers and resear ch . In  addition, a “health council” was to be established to
AW. XIX.22
'^Report Gets Good Marks, But Many Wonder Hliere Money Will Come From,"' Prince George Citizen, 
29 November, 2002, 33.
'"HealthReport Won't Be Shelved: PM'" Prince George Citizen, 29 November, 2002. 6.
“$27- Billion Deal on Health ‘ok ’ as a First Step,"" Province, 27 February 2003, A22. Also see 
“Chretien, Premiers Ink Health Deal,"" Prince George Citizen, 6 February 2003, 1; Tom Arnold, “Details 
o f the Plan: Medicare Changing Dramatically,"" National Post, 6 February 2003, A6; “Ottawa to Consider 
Health Cash Demands,"" Globe and Mail, 1 February 2003, A4.
® Ibid. Also see; “Feds Open Piggy Bank With Budget," Prince George Citizen, 19 February 2003, 1 ; 
Andre Picard, “Can the Deal Meet Expectations?" Globe and Mail, 6 February 2003, A4. Louise Elliott. 
“Unions, Territories Slam Health Deal,"" Prince George Citizen, 6 February 2003. 5.
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monitor and report on accountability, implementation and set performance indicators. 
British Columbia is scheduled to receive approximately $325 million in new funding 
over the course of the new agreement.^^
While there appeared to be renewed federal interest in ensuring the sustainability 
of health care, evident in the new funding arrangements, there are still several unresolved 
issues that will continue to plague the national program. First, the $13.5 billion over five 
years fails to renew a federal cash commitment at 25%, as a consequence fiscal 
negotiations will continue to be heated as the provinces recite demands for a meaningful 
federal financial commitment. Second, a base transfer guided by an escalator has not 
been established, which would ensure growth in the fiiture. Third, the current transfer 
arrangement has not been separated to improve “transparency,” continuing to discourage 
public understanding of financing and expenditures. Failure to reinvest means the 
recommendations of the Commission will unlikely be pursued and other reform options, 
that may deviate fi-om social expectations, will have to be investigated. Lastly, and most 
importantly, it appears that any further reforms, aside from an increased federal fiscal 
commitment, have disappeared into the bureaucratic backwoods. Canadians are once 
again left in the dark how fimding increases are actually going to play out at the local 
level. Despite the economic and fiscal focus that has dominated the health care debate, 
ultimately governments need to be accountable for funding and providing sound, stable 
social policies. To this point it seems unclear that either level of government is prepared 
to make this kind of commitment.
In 1978 Richard Simeon, Director of the Institute of Intergovernmental
Louise Elliott. ^"Unions, Territories Slam Health Deal’’ Prince George Citizen, 6 February 2003, 5. 
“$27- Billion Deal on Health ‘ok’ as a First Step,” Province, 27 February 2003, A22.
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Relations, authored words that continue to ring true in this century:
Our decision -  makers became preoccupied with questions of structure, 
with fiscal relations, with constitutional change, with who does what, 
rather than with the concrete problems of what will be done. The 
institutional interests of the competing governments predominate - all 
carried out in an arcane language of amendment formulas, tax points 
whose relevance to the citizen, and to what governments actually do for 
them is at best unclear. Major changes in the financing of hospital and 
medical care insurance have occurred, yet we know little about what, if 
any, differences these changes will mean for citizens.
Given a clear framework for reform, it is up to Canadians to understand the crucial issues
surrounding the health care debate and ensure reforms that reflect their values are
pursued in the future.
This thesis has sought to detail the historical development of Canada’s
comprehensive health care system and the sequence of adjustments to fiscal
arrangements that have guided its evolution. In the process I have analyzed a variety of
competing notions including jurisdictional issues and interpreting fiscal responsibilities,
compounded by a wide range of social expectations. This study has highlighted the
historical commitment which instigated the program and which should be honored by the
federal government. As Robert Gordon suggested, our current position has been the
result of a series of incremental policy adjustments overtime that gradually redefined
intergovernmental transfers for health care in Ca n ad a .W e  are at a crossroads, and
while reform must be encouraged at every level of government, it is clear that a federal
presence is necessary if we want to continue to have a universally, accessible, national
health care program.
Richard Simeon, “Intergovernmental Relations,” in Issues in Intergovernmental Relations (Toronto: 
Ontario Economic Council, 1978).
^  Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” Stanford Law Review 36 (1983-84), 85.
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